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COMMON SENSE, SIMPLICITY AND
EXPERIMENTAL USE NEGATION OF THE
PUBLIC USE AND ON SALE BARS TO
PATENTABILITY
WILLIAM

C.

ROOKLIDGE*

STEPHEN C. JENSEN**
INTRODUCTION

It was quite a compliment when Tennyson described the
Duke of Wellington as "Rich in saving common-sense, And, as the
greatest only are, In his simplicity sublime."' Common sense and
simplicity are indeed virtues, both in man and in the law. Unfortunately, because of the entropy of the common law, common
sense and simplicity are not always resting points for the law. Experimental use negation of the public use and on sale bars to
patentability exemplifies the effect of the relentless entropy of the
common law on common sense and simplicity.
The United States patent statute requires an inventor to file
an application for a patent within one year after placing the invention in public use or on sale in the United States.2 If the in-

* William C. Rooklidge is a director at Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady,
Falk & Rabkin in Newport Beach, California and a former judicial clerk to the
Honorable Helen W. Nies, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. The authors would like to thank Professor R. Carl Moy for his
invaluable assistance in preparing this paper and Chris Konkol and Patricia
Thayer for their helpful comments.
** Stephen C. Jensen is a partner at Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear in Newport Beach, California.
1. Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ode to the Death of the Duke of Wellington, stanza 4,
(1852), in A COLLECTION OF POEMS BY ALFRED TENNYSON 297-98 (Doubleday & Co.
ed., 1972).
2. This requirement is embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless... the invention was ... in public use or on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States"). Although these bars will likely survive any patent law revisions resulting from the presently-stalled patent harmonization process, they may
be modified in some respects. See The Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, A Report to the Secretary of Corn. 103-05 (1992) (urging application of the on
sale bar only to completed sales). Furthermore, although some have assumed that
the absolute language of Article 11(2)(b) of the Draft WIPO Harmonization Treaty
("prior art shall consist of everything which, before the filing date, or, where priority is claimed, the priority date of the application claiming the invention, has been
made available to the public anywhere in the world") will preclude consideration of
experimental use negation, eg. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n of Chi., IPLAC Position
Paper for the Diplomatic Conference on the Harmonization of Patent Laws, 4
(1993), the coexistence of experimental use negation with the similarly absolute
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ventor delays filing for more than a year after a public use or on
sale activity, the right to a United States patent is lost; that is,
patentability is barred. This provision of the patent statute defines what are known as the public use and on sale bars to patentability.
Notwithstanding the absolute language of the patent statute
pertaining to the public use and on sale bars, 170 years ago the
courts created what appears to be an exception to their application. The experimental use exception to, or "negation"of, the public
use and on sale bars is frequently encountered in both ex parte
and inter partes matters in the Patent and Trademark Office and
the federal district and appellate courts, and has developed a rich
history and voluminous body of case law and commentary.3
In 1982, Congress delegated all appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office and from the district courts in patent cases to
4
the new United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

language of the European Patent Convention suggests otherwise. See Prout v.
British Gas P.L.C., 1992 Fleet St. Rep. 351, 358-59.
3. The experimental use doctrine has been subject to much commentary. See
generally Thomas J. Cione, Patent Law's Experimental Use Doctrine:An Analysis of
Court Decisions Including Cases of the United States Court Of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 25 IDEA 225 (1985) (arguing that the Federal Circuit "seems to be
heading toward a more unified understanding of the [experimental use] doctrine");
Gerald T. Welch, Patent Law's Ephemeral Experimental Use Doctrine:Judicial Lip
Service To A JudicialMisnomer or the Experimental Stage Doctrine, 11 U. TOLEDO
L. REV. 865 (1980) (arguing that experimental use should apply to excuse any
activity conducted while invention is in the "experimental stage"); Roger M. FitzGerald, Comment, Experimentation in Public Use of Inventions - An Analysis of
Appellate Anemia, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 585 (arguing that experimental use is an "exception" to the bars rather than an "exclusion"); James S. Jorgenson, Note, Environmentally Dependant Inventions and the "On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars of
102(b): A Proffered Solution to the Statutory Dichotomy, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 185
(1994) (urging legislative revision of section 102(b) because of shortcomings in the
experimental use doctrine); Jay D. Schainholz, Note, The Validity of Patents After
Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 391 (1985) (arguing that market testing should be considered experimental
use); Henry R. Veenstra, Note, Patents - The Availability of the Experimental Use
Exception as a Stay of the On Sale and Public Use Bar in 102(b) Depends in Part
on the Intent of the Inventor, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 718 (1975); Anne Marie Kaiser, The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Experimental Use
Doctrine, 16 NEW MATTER 1 (1991) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has brought
"uniformity, clarity and certainty" to the application of the experimental use negation of the on sale and public use bars); Gale R. Peterson, Experimental Use in the
United States: An "Exception" to the One-Year Time Bar?, 45 PAT. WORLD 16, 18
(1992) (arguing that the Federal Circuit "has left the bar and the trial bench with
little more than a set of rather broad subjective factors and no focused analysis");
Note, The Public Use Bar to Patentability:Two New Approaches to the Experimental Use Exception, 52 MINN. L. REV. 851 (1968) (proposing use of "subtests" or
"policy" approaches to experimental use, rather than what the author believed was
the prevailing "stage of the invention" analysis).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (a)(4) (1988).
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The Federal Circuit soon came face-to-face with experimental use
negation of the public use and on sale bars.
In TP Laboratories,Inc. v. Professional Positioners,Inc.,' the
Federal Circuit considered an allegation of public use of an
orthodontal device for six years before the filing of the patent
application. The court began by observing that "[t]he general
purpose behind all the [§102(b)] bars is to require inventors to
assert with due diligence their right to a patent through the
prompt filing ... of a patent application."' On the other hand,
the court recognized that, "the public interest is also deemed to be
served by allowing an inventor time to perfect his invention, by
public testing, if desired."7 The Federal Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court's opinion in City of Elizabeth v. American
Nicholson Pavement Co.' "is the starting place for analysis of any
case involving experimental use," and block-quoted an entire page
from that opinion.9 After exploring the burden of proof related to
experimental use,'0 the Federal Circuit explained that experimental use is an integral part of the issue of whether there is a
public use, which can only be resolved "upon consideration of the
entire surrounding circumstances."" The surrounding circumstances include: length of the test period, payment, secrecy, records, number of tests, identity of persons conducting the tests
2
and length of test periods of other similar devices.
Applying these principles to the six years of public use of the
subject orthodontal devices, the Federal Circuit in TP Laboratories held that the uses were experimental. 3 The inventor used
the devices on only three patients, kept detailed progress records,
made no extra 4charge for the devices and never sold them to other

orthodontists. "

TP Laboratories established the substantive framework for
all of the Federal Circuit's experimental use cases, a framework
taken straight from City of Elizabeth. Perhaps more importantly,
however, TP Laboratories sowed four interrelated seeds of confusion in the experimental use analysis.

5. 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
6. Id. at 968 (quoting 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 601 (1981 & Supp.
1983)).
7. Id. While not quite correct (experimental use negation gives the inventor
the opportunity, not the time), this is the policy basis for experimental use negation of the on sale and public use bars. Id.
8. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
9. TP Lab., 742 F.2d at 970-71.
10. Id. at 971. See discussion infra Part II(C).
11. Id. at 971-72.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 973.
14. Id. at 972-73.
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First, the Federal Circuit created the potential for confusion
by the way in which it rejected the TP Laboratoriesdistrict court's
two-step experimental use "exception" analysis: "determine whether a public use occurred"; then, if a public use occurred, determine
"whether the use was not a public use under the statute because
it was experimental.""5 The Federal Circuit pointed out that the
Supreme Court had never treated experimental use as an exception, but rather as a factor negating the statutory bar. The Federal Circuit explained: "It is incorrect to ask: Was it public use?'
and then, 'Was it experimental?' Rather, the court is faced with a
single issue: Was it public use under § 102(b)?" 6 This holding is
unquestionably correct. Where the patentee raises the experimental use issue, that issue must be resolved before the activity could
be considered a public use. But, as we will see, subsequent readers have interpreted this holding much more broadly, and that
interpretation has led to confusion.
Second, the Federal Circuit created the potential for confusion when it held that the district court should have looked at all
the evidence "put forth by both parties and should have decided
whether the entirety of the evidence led to the conclusion that
there had been 'public use.'

. .

. In other words, a decision on

whether there has been a 'public use' can only be made upon consideration of the entire surrounding circumstances."17 Once
again, this holding is correct. The two holdings might be viewed,
however, as implying that the Federal Circuit eliminated experimental use as a separate inquiry, relegating experimental use to a
mere evidentiary factor considered in determining whether a public use has occurred. Such an implication would be wrong."8
Third, the Federal Circuit created the potential for confusion
by identifying the specific policies underlying the public use and
on sale bars without identifying which policies underlie which
components of the bars. 9 While others have analyzed these policies at length, ° the Federal Circuit has never paid them more
than mere lip service. As we will see, the Federal Circuit's inattention to the policies has allowed confusion regarding the role of
experimental use negation to creep into its opinions. 2'
Finally, the Federal Circuit created the potential for confu-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 968-69.
Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
Id. at 971-72.
See discussion infra Part II(C)(2).
TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 968.

20. Eg., Patrick J. Barrett, New Guidelinesfor Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REV. 730, 735 (1972); William C. Rooklidge, The On Sale
and Public Use Bars To Patentability:The Policies Reexamined, 1 FED. CiR. B.J. 7,

10 (1991).
21. See discussion infra Part 11(A).
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sion with its analysis of the burden of proof. The district court in
TP Laboratoriesascribed to the patentee "a heavy burden of showing that the public use was bona fide experimentation."22 The
Federal Circuit held that the patentee does not bear the burden of
proof on the experimental use issue. The patent statute places the
burden of proof (or, more accurately, the burden of persuasion) of
patent invalidity on the proponent of invalidity.2 3 Because the
burden of proving patent invalidity remains at all times on the
proponent of invalidity, the court reasoned, "it is incorrect to impose upon the patent owner ... the burden of proving that a 'public use' was 'experimental.'"24 This holding seems at first blush to
be directly contrary to that of the Supreme Court in Smith &
Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague,25 that the proponent of
experimental use need prove experimental use by "full, unequivocal and convincing" evidence.26 The apparent conflict is exacerbated by the court's oblique treatment of Smith & Griggs: that the
Federal Circuit did "not read Smith & Griggs .. . as contrary" to
the Federal Circuit's holding and, even if it did, Smith & Griggs
would not be "tenable in the face of the subsequently enabled
statutory presumption."27 Most commentators were unpersuaded
by this explanation of the burden of persuasion versus burden of
going forward. But the burden borne by the proponent of experimental use - whether it be burden of persuasion or burden of
going forward - is not the entire issue. As explained in this article, that issue implicates a possibly more important issue, the
standard of proof on the issue of experimental use, a point that in
many cases could be outcome determinative.28
In Part I, this article briefly reviews the history and case law
on experimental use, focusing on the fifty years of pre 1877 history that have been ignored by commentators. 29 The article explains that the relationship between the development of experimental use negation and the statutory grace period, adopted as a
two-year grace period in 1839 and reduced to one year in 1939,

22. TPLab., 724 F.2d at 969.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988); TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971.
24. TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971.
25. 123 U.S. 249 (1887).
26. Id. at 260. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
27. TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971 n.3.
28. See discussion infra Parts II(C)(2)-(3).
29. Many commentators express the incorrect belief that the Supreme Court
created experimental use negation in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877). E.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTs OV-7 (1994)
("City of Elizabeth ...

established the experimental use doctrine ."); Edward G.

Poplawski & Paul D. Tripodi, The Impact of Over Ten Years of Federal Circuit
Precedent on the "OnSale" and "PublicUse" Bars to Patentability, 19 NEW MATTER
1, 8 (1994).
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identifies that the policy underlying experimental use negation is
to give the inventor the opportunity to perfect or complete the
invention, that is, to reduce the invention to practice. The paper
then explains that the courts had developed from this policy a
simple, common sense framework for applying experimental use
negation of the public use and on sale bars to patentability, a
framework summarized in two important Supreme Court cases. 0
In Part II, this article surveys the state of the modern law as
applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The article suggests that the Federal Circuit has lost
sight of the policy underlying experimental use negation, has
unduly complicated the application of experimental use negation,
and has introduced some basic errors into its analysis. This paper
concludes by proposing that the Federal Circuit correct these
errors by returning to the law of experimental use set out with
common sense and in sublime simplicity by the Supreme Court
over 100 years ago.
I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL USE
NEGATION OF THE PUBLIC USE AND ON SALE BARS

Although the United States borrowed much of its early patent law from England,"' experimental use negation of the public
use and on sale bars is a distinctly American development.3 2
Like many legal developments, the courts were entirely responsible for the development of experimental use.
A. The Early Cases
American courts created experimental use negation in applying the Patent Act of 1793, which provided that knowledge or use

30. See discussion infra Parts I(B)-(C).
31. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18 (1829); 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON,
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 15 (1890).
32. In 1823, Richard Godson assessed the English case law and observed:
Whether experiments made with a view to try the efficacy of an invention, or
the full extent of a discovery, are a using within the meaning of the statute
of James has not yet been decided. It would be very difficult to say how
much a substance or machine might be used by way of experiment before
the patent is obtained, without running a great risk of invalidating the
grant.
RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTIcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND ON COPYRIGHT 64-65 (1823). He maintained this view in his second
edition. RicHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
INVENTIONS AND ON COPYRIGHT 51 (2d ed. 1851). The English cases had, by then,
held that failed, secret, third-party experiments did not create a public use bar,
Cornish v. Keene, 1 Webster's Pat. Cas. 501, 508, 512 (1835), and obliquely discussed in a jury charge open, experimental use by the inventor. Elliott v. Ashton, 1
Webster's Pat. Cas. 222, 224 (1840).
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of the invention before the date of the patent application would
bar the grant of a valid patent,33 and the Patent Act of 1836,
which provided that placing the invention in public use or on sale,
with the consent or allowance of the inventor, would bar the grant
of a valid patent and serve as a basis for invalidating a patent.34
Under the literal language of both these statutes, any act placing
the invention in the possession of the public before the filing of
the patent application barred the grant of a valid patent. Despite
the absolute nature of the literal language of these statutes, and
in a sense because of it, the courts reasoned that the inventor's
use of the invention in public for the purpose of testing the invention could not raise a bar to patentability. Because an inventor
may need to test the invention before filing a patent application,
the courts reasoned, the tests must not be the kind of use that
constitutes a public use under the patent statute.
In 1824, Circuit Judge Thompson instructed the jury in Morris v. Huntington35 that the public use bar of the 1793 statute

33. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318-23 (authorizing the grant of a
patent for "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, ... not known or used before the application"). The first patent statute, the
1790 Patent Act, had authorized the grant of a patent for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known
or used." Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-12.
34. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (authorizing grant of patent for
"any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not...
at the time of his application for a patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent
or allowance") and id. at § 15 (authorizing the pleading of defenses to patent infringement, including that the invention "had been in public use, or on sale, with
the consent and allowance of the patentee before his application for patent"). Under these provisions, an activity conducted before the application with the
inventor's consent could bar a patent but an activity conducted before the application, without the inventor's consent, could not. The "consent or allowance" language was dropped in the 1870 Patent Act. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16
Stat. 201.
In the 1836 Patent Act, Congress had created a device known as a "caveat," a
document that the inventor could file in the Patent Office to provisionally lay claim
to the invention before filing the patent application. In explaining how this caveat
worked, the Senate Report accompanying the 1836 Patent Act discussed inventors'
need for experiments:
The first conception of ingenuity, like the first suggestions of science, are
theories which require something of experiment and practical exemplification to perfect. Mechanical inventions are at first necessarily crude and incomplete. Time is required to develop their imperfections and to make the
improvements necessary to their adaption to practical uses. Inventors generally obtain patents before they venture upon those experiments which only
can test their inventions. They are apprehensive of being forestalled in their
discoveries, and see no other means of protecting themselves against piracy
and fraud, than by securing patents at once.
S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1836).
35. 17 F. Cas. 818, 819 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824) (No. 9,831).
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was not absolute:
No man is to be permitted to lie by for years, and then take out a
patent. If he has been practicing his invention with a view of improving it, and thereby rendering it a greater benefit to the public
before taking out a patent, that ought not to prejudice him. But it
should always be a question submitted to the jury, what was the
intent of the delay of the patent, and whether the allowing the
invention to be used without a patent should not be considered an
abandonment or present of it to the public.36
Although this jury charge turned out to be dicta," it was widely
perceived as establishing experimental use negation of the public
use bar.3"
Five years later, the Supreme Court considered experimental
use arguments in Pennock v. Dialogue,39 a case where the jury

36. Id. at 820.
37. The facts of Morris presented a question of novelty intertwined with a
question of what has since become known as reissue practice. The inventor took
out a patent and then six years later, obtained a reissue patent without surrendering the original patent. Id. at 818. After instructing the jury, Judge Thompson
directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, invalidating the second patent on the
ground that the first patent had not been surrendered. Id. at 819-20.
38. See, e.g., Letter from the Secretary of State Transmittinga List ofAll Patents
Granted by the United States, the Acts of CongressRelating Thereto, and the Decisions of Courts of the United States, H.R. Doc. NO. 50, 21st Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1831); WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 187 (1837). The

very next year, Supreme Court Justice Story, sitting as circuit justice in Mellus v.
Silsbee, charged the jury at length regarding the public use bar. 16 F. Cas. 1332,
1334 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 9,404). He explained that a patent is not to be
barred by an inventor's "licensing a few persons to use his invention to ascertain
its utility." Id. This brief comment marked the first of Justice Story's four occasions
to consider experimental use. See infra note 51. No other jurist would contribute as
much to the law of experimental use until Judge (later Chief Judge) Helen Nies of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v.
Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). Perhaps no other jurist has contributed as much to patent law as Justice Story. See
Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932, 939-40, 956 (1991) ("Story's [patent] decisions reflect the changes that
law underwent as it struggled to uphold community interests at the same time
that it sought to encourage inventors").
39. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). In the meantime, Justice Washington had rejected
the application of experimental use to third-party activities in Watson v. Bladen.
29 F. Cas. 424 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1826) (No. 17,277). Instructing the jury in a case involving a machine for making crackers, Justice Washington said:
It surely cannot be denied that the act of making crackers with [the machine] amounted to a using of it according to the common and accepted
meaning of that phrase: and I am quite at a loss to imagine how this
meaning can be varied by the particular motive which induced the inventor
so to employ the machine. I can discover nothing in the patent act which
will authorize the court to depart from the ordinary meaning of this expression, and to declare that a machine which is put into operation for the sole
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had held the patent invalid because the patentee had sold some
13,000 feet of the claimed hose invention during the seven years
before applying for the patent. On appeal, Daniel Webster argued for the patentee that "the invention, being of such a nature
that the use of it, for the purpose of trying its utility and bringing
it to perfection, must necessarily be open and public,"4 ' and that
the pre-application use by the patentee was not "voluntary
abandonment, or negligence, or unreasonable delay in obtaining
letters-patent, to destroy the right of the patentee."42 Although
recognizing the absolute language of the 1793 Patent Act, counsel
for the accused infringer admitted that the inventor's own knowledge and use would not be a bar "because every inventor must
know his invention, and must use it to the extent of ascertaining
its usefulness, before he applies for a patent."43 In delivering the
opinion of the court, Justice Story addressed the experimental use
issue:
What then is the true meaning of the words "not known or used
before the application?"They cannot mean that the thing invented
was not known or used before the application, by the inventor himself, for that would be to prohibit him from the only means of obtaining a patent. The use, as well as the knowledge of his invention,
must be indispensable to enable him to ascertain its competency to
the end proposed, as well as to perfect its component parts. The
words then, to have any rational interpretation, must mean, not
known or used by others, before the application.'
purpose (if such be the case) of trying its practical utility, is not used within
the meaning and intent of the sixth section of that act.
Id. at 425-26.
40. Daniel Webster, commonly considered the 19th Century's leading advocate,
tried and argued many patent cases, including Keplinger v. DeYoung, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 358 (1825), Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832), Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646 (1846), Wilson v. Turner, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712 (1846),
Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850), Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 477 (1850), and his last case, Goodyear v. Day, 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.D.N.J.
.1852) (No. 5,569). See ARTHUR CANNON, SPEECH OF THE HON. DANIEL WEBSTER IN
THE GREAT INDIA RUBBER SUIT (1852); 2 GEORGE T. CURTIS, LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER 591-92 (1930); 2 CLAUDE M. FUESS, DANIEL WEBSTER 319-21

(1930); Lubar,

supra note 38, at 956-58. Webster had as "his beloved friend and counselor" Justice
Story, Fuess, supra, at 149, and had as his biographer George Ticknor Curtis, the
author of four editions of the preeminent pre-1890 patent law treatise. See CURTIS,
supra, at 591-92.
41. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 4.
42. Id. at 6. Counsel for the defendant argued that the seven years of hose sales
had been made "not to experiment with, in order to bring the invention to perfection; but for public use, as a thing already completed, and adapted to the purpose
of arresting the ravages of fire." Id. at 9. Per defendant's counsel, the invention
was used from 1811 to 1818 and "was never materially altered or improved. The
thing patented in 1818 was precisely the thing invented, completed and used in
1811." Id.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original). Based on the facts of the case, the Su-
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The court in Pennock, therefore, adopted experimental use negation of the public use bar as a matter of logic,45 in defiance of the
plain language of the 1793 Patent Act.46
Four years later, the Supreme Court returned to the experimental use issue in Shaw v. Cooper.47 The jury had entered a
verdict in favor of the defendant on the ground that plaintiffs
patent was invalidated by pre-application public use of the invention in France and Germany. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the reason he delayed seeking the patent was that the invention

preme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment that the patentee's sale of
13,000 feet of hose before filing the patent application constituted a barring public
use. Id.
Phillips speculated that the cursory treatment of experimental use in Pennock
v. Dialogue was due to the fact that the "doctrine here laid down as to the experiments, and the use of the invention for the purpose of perfecting it, is assumed and
taken for granted, in so much that a formal statement of it is superfluous." PHILLIPS, supra note 38, at 187-88.
45. In Treadwell v. Bladen, Justice Washington cited Morris v. Huntington with
approval and charged the jury that "the patent law would very nearly become a
dead letter; as every inventor uses the machine he invents before he applies for a
patent, with a view to satisfying himself whether it answers the purpose for which
is was intended." 24 F. Cas. 144, 116-47 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 14,154). Justice
Washington's premise, and Justice Story's premise in Pennock v. Dialogue, is, of
course, faulty because there is no requirement that an invention be shown to work
for its intended purpose before filing a patent application, and there never has
been such a requirement.
46. The next case to consider experimental use was Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F.
Cas. 1074 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585). In that 1831 case, Supreme Court
Justice Baldwin, sitting as circuit justice, charged the jury regarding infringement
and validity of a patent for manufacturing glass knobs. He addressed the allegation of invalidity based on a prior public use as follows:
The time during which the thing patented had been known and used is not
material, the criterion is its public, not its private or surreptitious use, but
the use with the consent of the inventor express, or implied from circumstances. A patentee may take a reasonable time to make his specification,
drawings, model, to try experiments on the effect and operation of his machinery, in order to know whether the thing patented can be produced in the
mode specified; he may disclose his secret to those he may wish to consult,
or call to his assistance any persons to aid him in making or using his machine, and preparations for procuring his patent. So if the machine is to
operate publicly, as in steam boats, a public experiment may be made, or if
the patentee is informed that others are using his invention, he may disclose
it to them in order to give notice of what it consists, and caution them
against its infringement. In either of these and like cases, a disclosure of the
secret would not be such previous knowledge, or the use of the invention be
such an use, as would impair the patent if taken out in a reasonable time
after the discovery, the question of due diligence or negligence is for the jury
on all the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 1077-78. Although Whitney's alleged public use was not recorded, the jury
entered a verdict for the patentee in the amount of $500. Id. at 1083.
47. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833).
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"was not so perfect as he wished to make it, before he introduced
it to public use; and that he did make alterations in his invention,
up to about the date of his patent, which some witnesses considered as improvements, and others did not."48 The Supreme Court
quoted in full the experimental use passage from the jury instruction in Morris v. Huntington,49 then went on to construe knowledge and use under the Patent Act of 1793:
The knowledge or use spoken of in the Act of 1793, could have referred to the public only, for the provision would be nugatory if it
were applied to the inventor himself. He must, necessarily, have a
perfect knowledge of the thing invented and its use, before he can
describe it, as by law he is required to do, prefatory to the emanation of a patent. 50
These and other early cases firmly established experimental
use negation of the 1793 and 1836 Patent Acts' public use and on
sale bars."1 Most of these cases relied on the absolute nature of

48. Id. at 303.

49. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Morris.
50. Shaw, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.),at 318. The Supreme Court later quoted this passage
in Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 330 (1858).
The Shaw v. Cooper court rejected the patentee's claims that he delayed filing
his application to make his invention more perfect: "It seems, by this delay, he was
not enabled, essentially, to vary or improve it. The plan is substantially the same
as was carried into public use through the brother of the plaintiff, in England.
Such an excuse, therefore, cannot avail the plaintiff." Shaw, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 322.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court that
the patent was invalid on the ground of public use. Id.
51. Experimental use next arose in Ryan v. Goodwin, an infringement action
involving "friction matches for the instantaneous production of light." 21 F. Cas.
110 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 12,186). Justice Story, sitting as circuit justice, instructed the jury that "if the use be merely experimental, to ascertain the value or
utility, or success of the invention, by putting it in practice, that is not such a use,
as will deprive the inventor of his title." Id. at 111.
The next year, Justice Story addressed experimental use in Wyeth v. Stone, a
bill in equity seeking an injunction against infringement of a patent on an ice cutting device. 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107). Without identifying
whether he was relying on the 1793 or 1836 patent statute, Justice Story rejected
the defendant's contention that the patent was barred by public use: "If it was
merely used occasionally by himself in trying experiments, or if he allowed only a
temporary use thereof by a few persons, as an act of personal accommodation or
neighborly kindness, for a short and limited period, that would not take away his
right to a patent." Id. at 726.
Curtis adopted Justice Story's Wyeth v. Stone formulation of experimental
use. GEORGE T. CURTIS, THE LAW OF PATENTS 46 (1849) ("if allowed for a short, or
definite period, as an act of kindness, or as a means of continuing experiments and
testing the utility of the invention it would not have had the effect of defeating the
patent under the Act of 1836."); GEORGE T. CURTIS, THE LAw OF PATENTS 74 (2d
ed. 1854) (same). The court in Blackinton v. Douglass, clarified that "a use in public unlimited in time, extent or object" will bar a patent "whatever the motive of
the inventor in granting such unlimited indulgence to two or three friends." 3 Fed.
Cas. 537, 539 (C.C.D.C. 1859) (No. 1,470).
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the statutory language and the inventor's need to conduct preapplication experiments. The only way to reconcile the two was to
interpret the statutory language not to apply to these pre-application experiments.
B. The 1839 Patent Act
The 1839 Patent Act modified the absolute language of the
1836 Patent Act's public use and on sale bars by adopting a twoyear grace period in which the inventor and others could place the
invention in public use or on sale without barring patentability:
"no patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase,
sale or use prior to the application for patent as aforesaid, except
on proof ... that such purchase, sale or prior use has been for
more than two years prior to such application for patent."12 Long
after the fact, the Supreme Court suggested that the purpose of
the two-year grace period was to resolve an ambiguity in the 1836
Act regarding consented and unconsented uses.53 Contemporary
sources show, however, that the Court was mistaken.
Contemporary sources reveal that the two-year grace period
resulted from three factors: the controversy raised by employed
inventors over their difficulty in investingtime, effort and money
into their inventions; the ban on patenting inventions already
placed in public use or on sale; and the creation of common law
shop rights in the employers of these inventors.5 4 Employed inventors, who often lacked the resources to develop their inven-

52. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353-55.
53. Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267, 274 (1887), affd on rehearing, 124 U.S.
694 (1888), stated:
The evident purpose of the section was to fix a period of limitation which
should be certain, and require only a calculation of time, and should not
depend upon the uncertain question of whether the applicant had consented
to or allowed the sale or use. Its object was to require the inventor to see to
it that he filed his application within two years from the completion of his
invention, so as to cut off all question of the defeat of his patent by a use or
sale of it by others more than two years prior to his application, and thus
leave open only the question of priority of invention. The evident intention of
Congress was to take away the right (which existed under the act of 1836) to
obtain a patent after an invention had for a long period of time been in public use, without the consent or allowance of the inventor; it limited that
period to two years, whether the inventor had or had not consented to or
allowed the public use.
Id. Accord GEORGE T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS 48 (1849). However, the grace period did not resolve the ambiguity.
See Andrews, 123 U.S. at 274. See also Note, Changes in the Patent Laws, 21 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 703, 711-14 (1939).
54. Lubar, supra note 38, at 948-49 (quoting Petition of Thomas Baldwin,
Feb. 1, 1833, N.A., Patents, H.R. 25A-G14.1; Petition of George Grey, June 2, 1836,
N.A., Patents, HR 25A-G14.1).
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tions, that allowed their employers to use their inventions before
filing their patent applications found their employers vested with
a shop right to use the invention and their own ability to patent
the invention precluded by their employer's use or sale of the
invention.5" Congress addressed these problems in the 1839 Patent Act by granting inventors a two-year grace period and by
granting to their employers and others prior user rights.5 6 Giving
inventors time to experiment appears to have 5been
one of the
7
reasons for adoption of the two-year grace period.
Regardless of its purpose, the 1839 Patent Act's adoption of
the two-year grace period eliminated the logical basis for creation
of experimental use negation by giving the inventor two years in
which to test the invention before filing a patent application. As a
result, considerable doubt arose regarding whether experimental
use negation of the public use and on sale bars survived the adoption of the two-year grace period. For example, in Adams v. Edwards,5 8 Justice Woodbury, sitting as circuit justice, charged the
jury regarding public use and referred to experimental use: "[t]he
law has come in, and given two-year's use and sale to the inventor, without being barred so as to prevent experiments and trials
of machines, to improve them."59 In Justice Woodbury's view,
Congress provided the two-year grace period to allow experimental use.6 ° The implication is that Congress replaced experimental

55. Id. at 949.
56. Section 7 of the 1839 Patent Act gave "every person or corporation who
has ...

purchased or constructed any newly invented machine ...

prior to the ap-

plication by the inventor ...for a patent" the right to use and sell the machine
"without liability therefor to the inventor." Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat.
353-55. These prior user rights quickly became the most controversial aspect of the
patent laws. Lubar, supra note 38, at 949.
57. Patent Laws - A Citizen of Pennsylvania -Amend., H.R. Doc. No. 521, 23d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1834) (urging Congress to institute a five-year grace period to
help inventors afford "the labor and expense of trying experiments"). See also Petition of George Grey, June 2, 1836, N.A., Patents, H.R. 25A-G14.1 (seeking renewal
of patent and complaining of the "great variety of experiments which he had to
make to bring the invention to maturity" and that "it was very difficult for me to
see how a man could apply for a patent without knowing the subject of the invention or discovery himself and frequently it requires the joint labor of practical Mechanics and Artisans to bring them to maturity," thereby "it became an impossibility to see how inventions could be kept from the knowledge of the public.").
58. 1 F. Cas. 112 (C.C.D. Mass. 1848) (No. 53).
59. Id. at 117.
60. Although no issue of experimental use was involved in Blandy v. Griffith,
Circuit Justice Swayne did not leave much room for it in his interpretation of the
1839 Patent Act:
The [1839 Patent Act] is inflexible as to the time when the patent is to be
applied for, with reference to the prior use and sale of the invention. The
neglect to apply within two years after such sale or use is inevitably fatal.
Whenever this fact appears, the patent falls. Whatever the circumstance, the
courts have no dispensing power.
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use negation with a two-year grace period. Curtis also hinted that
the two-year grace period adopted in 1839 may have eliminated
the doctrine of experimental use."'
Most courts, however, ignored the potential effect of the 1839
Act's adoption of a two-year grace period and continued to apply
experimental use negation of the public use and on sale bars to
activities conducted more than two years before the application.62 They did so with good reason. Particularly in instances

3 F. Cas. 675, 682 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1869) (No. 1,529).
61. On one hand, Curtis emphatically stated that "where the patentee alone
makes the thing for the purposes of experiment and completion, without selling it
to be used by others, the term 'public use' is not applicable." GEORGE T. CURTIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 404 (3d ed. 1867).
Likewise he stated that:
[wihere a party practices his invention himself, for the purposes of experimental completion, before he takes out a patent, the inference that he intends to surrender his invention to the public does not arise; and, consequently, a dedication cannot be proved by evidence that shows only experimental practice by the inventor, whether in public or in private.
Id. at 408. On the other hand, Curtis explained experimental use in view of the
two-year grace period as follows: "In this country, under the provisions of the Act
of 1839, this doctrine, if applicable at all, could or need only be applied to such
profitable experiments as take place more than two years before the application for
letters-patent." Id. at 411 (emphasis added). Curtis carried the identical text over
into his fourth edition. GEORGE T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 517-20 (4th ed. 1878).
62. E.g., Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 607-08 (1868)
(holding "mere forbearance to apply for a patent during the progress of experiments, and until the party has perfected his invention and tested its value by actual practice, affords no just grounds" to bar the patent); Henry v. Francestown SoapStone Co., 2 F. 78, 81 (C.C.D.N.H. 1880) (stating "whether use or sale, that particular transaction must be experimental, or it is within the forfeiture of the statute"); Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 443 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 1,434)
("Public use in good faith for experimental purposes and for a reasonable period,
even before the beginning of the two years of limitation, cannot affect the rights of
the inventor."); Locomotive Engine Safety Truck Co. v. Penn. R Co., 15 F. Cas. 776,
780 (E.D. Pa. 1874) (No. 8,453) (stating "the mere forbearance to apply for a patent, during the progress of experiments, and until the party has perfected his invention, and tested its value by actual practice, affords no just grounds for presuming an abandonment."), rev'd on other grounds, 110 U.S. 490 (1884); Jones v.
Sewall, 13 F. Cas. 1017, 1027 (C.C.D. Me. 1873) (No. 7,495) (stating "if the use is
merely experimental, to ascertain the value, utility, or success of the invention by
putting it in practice, that is not such a sale or use as will deprive the inventor of
his title."), rev'd, 91 U.S. 171 (1875); M'Millin v. Barclay, 16 F. Cas. 302, 305 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1871) (No. 8,902) ("It remains,. then, to inquire whether the use by the
patentee of his invention, more than two years before his application for a patent,
was only a trial of it to test its efficiency, or ascertain its defects, and was, therefore, merely experimental."); American Hide & Mach. Co. v. American Tool &
Mach. Co., 1 F. Cas. 647, 652 (C.C.D. Mass. 1870) (No. 302) (rejecting patentee's
contention "that, although these machines may have embodied the devices described in both these patents, the machines which were put on sale and in public
use were not perfect machines; that perfection had not been attained; and that
they were put on sale in a crude and unfinished condition, for experiment"); Sand-
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where durability is an important aspect of the invention, the need
for experiments may extend well beyond two years. In just such a
case, the Supreme Court was to soon resolve any doubt about the
continuing vitality of experimental use.
C. City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co.
In City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co.,63
American Nicholson Pavement Company sued the City of Elizabeth, New Jersey for infringement of a patent on a wooden block
pavement. The City asserted, among other things, that the inventor had abandoned the invention by publicly using a seventy-five
foot section of the pavement on a private toll road for six years
before he applied for his patent.' The purpose of the invention
was to provide a pavement that was "comparatively permanent
and durable,... [and] provided] against the slipping of the
horses' feet, against noise, against unequal wear, and against rot
and consequent sinking away from below."6" The Court found it
important that the inventor constructed the road at his own expense, and that the toll collector testified that the inventor would
come, on almost a daily basis, to inspect the portion of the road he
constructed, tapping it with his cane, examining it and asking
him what the wagon drivers thought of it. 6 After six years of
monitoring the results of the use of the pavement for its intended

ers v. Logan, 21 F. Cas. 321, 324 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 12,295) ("The allegation
that these machines were made and incorporated into so many mills all over the
country for the purposes of experiment, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment"); Seeley v. Bean, 21 F. Cas. 1011, 1013-14 (C.C.D.C 1861) (No. 12,629) (rejecting assertion of experimental sales "after the machine had been completed and
put on sale for public use in the shop, on account of the purchaser himself, and not
as a neighborly act on account of the inventors, without profit, without limit of
time or restraint as to public or private use"); Lovering v. Dutcher, 15 F. Cas.
1001, 1002 (C.C.D.C. 1861) (No. 8,553) (rejecting experimental use where activities
more than two years before application were conducted after the invention was
"perfect"); Bell v. Daniels, 3 F. Cas. 96, 99 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1858) (No. 1,247) ("if the
jury find that the invention was used by others, or even by one person, with the
consent or allowance of the inventor publicly, and for more than two years before
the application for a patent, or if they find that it was publicly used for a long
period by the inventor himself, not in the way of experiment, but for gain, in either
case the patent is void"); Pitts v. Hall, 19 F. Cas. 754, 756-57 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851)
(No. 11,192) (instructing jury to reject alleged experimental use "if the machine
was complete when it was constructed. .. , and if the patentee put it into public
use, or put it in operation publicly, deriving profit from it, and having no view of
further improvements or of ascertaining its defects"); Winans v. Schenectady &
T.R. Co., 30 F. Cas. 277, 285 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 17,865) ("The law allows the
inventor a reasonable time to perfect his invention by experiments").
63. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
64. Id. at 129.
65. Id. at 127.
66. Id. at 133.
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purpose, and after making no changes to his invention, the inventor became convinced that his paving system worked as a useful
and durable road and he filed a patent application.6 7
Before addressing whether the inventor's activities were
experimental, the Court outlined seven principles of experimental
use:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Although the nature of the pavement invention was such
that it could not be experimented upon satisfactorily except on a highway, which is always public, even if a device is of a nature that it may be experimented on in private, its experimental use in public will still not create
a bar;6"
An inventor need not alter the invention as a result of
the activity for that activity to be experimental;6 9
If durability is one of the qualities to be attained, a long
period, perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the
inventor to discover whether the invention will work for
its intended purpose;7 °
The inventor does not have to build and use an embodiment of the invention in his own shop or on 7his own
premises for the activity to be experimental; 1
That the public may incidentally derive a benefit from
the activity does not deprive the activity of its
experimental nature;72
A use pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the
qualities of the machine is not a public use within the
meaning of the statute, and so long as the inventor neither voluntarily allows others to make and use his invention, nor sells it for general use, he keeps the invention
under his control, and does not lose his title to a patent;73 and
To be experimental, an activity must
be conducted "un74
der the surveillance of the inventor."

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that the

67. Id. at 136.
68. Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 134-35.
69. Id. at 135. This principle is directly contrary to the reason that the Supreme
Court rejected the assertion of experimental use in Shaw v. Cooper, that the inventor made no changes to the invention as a result of the alleged experiments. See
supra note 50.
70. Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 135.
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public testing did not place the invention in public use, observing
that "it is the interest of the public, as well as [the inventor], that
the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a patent is granted for it." 75 The Court held that the inventor did not
abandon his invention because he had not profited by the use of
the pavement and because he was engaged in bona fide experimentation to perfect his invention and to ascertain whether it
would work as intended.76 The Court held that mere use of the
pavement in public did not necessarily establish that the invention had been placed in public use.77 The Court reasoned that
"[t]he use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to
bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as [a
public use]."78
D. Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague
The Supreme Court returned to the experimental use issue in
1887 in Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague.79 In that
case, the patentee had made and sold more than seven million
shoe buckles using machinery containing improvements for which
he later sought and obtained a patent. After making those sales
over a four-year period, the patentee made several minor changes
in portions of the machinery separate from the claimed invention,
then filed the patent application." The manufacture of the buckles was, per Justice Matthews, "a public use in the sense of the
statute,"8 but was held by the Circuit Court not to be "a public
use within the prohibition of the statute so as to defeat the patent
because
that use was experimental only, of an imperfect ma82
chine."
The court in Smith & Griggs identified two simple rules
regarding experimental use. First, to be considered experimental,
the activity must be conducted "substantially for purposes of experiment."8 3 That is, that the patentee makes an incidental prof-

75. Id. at 137.
76. Id. at 136.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 134.
79. 123 U.S. 249 (1887).
80. Id. at 253-55.
81. That use of the machinery was "by the [patentee] in the regular conduct of
his business by workmen employed by him in its operation, and in view of such
part of the public as chose to resort to his establishment, either for the purpose of
selling material for the manufacture or of purchasing its product." Id. at 254.
82. Id.
83. The Court noted:
A use by the inventor, for the purpose of testing the machine, in order by
experiment to devise additional means for perfecting the success of its oper-
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it does not change the experimental nature of the activity. Second,
where a prima facie case of public use has been established by
clear and convincing evidence, "the proof on the part of the patentee.., should be full, unequivocal, and convincing." 84 Applying
these rules, the Court reversed the experimental use determination because the patentee's testimony was "indefinite and vague,"
because the manufacture of the buckles was not substantially for
experimental purpose 5 and because the changes made to the
machinery - the only asserted basis for the experimentation
8
were to portions separate from the claimed invention. 6
E. The 1939 Patent Act
In the 1939 Patent Act, Congress shortened the two-year
grace period to one year. 7 In the legislative history, Congress
explained that the purpose of the grace period was to allow the
inventor time to "make up his mind whether or not to file an
application for patent."8 And Congress also recognized that experimentation could end before the grace period begins. 89 Thus,

ation, is admissible; and where, as incident to such use, the product of its
operation is disposed of by sale, such profit from its use does not change its
character; but where the use is mainly for the purposes of trade and profit,
and the experiment is merely incidental to that, the principal and not the
incident must give character to the use. The thing implied as excepted out of
the prohibition of the statute is a use which may be properly characterized
as substantially for purposes of experiment.
Id. at 256.
84. Smith, 123 U.S. at 264.
85. The Court noted:
The proof falls far short of establishing that the main purpose in view, in
the use of the machine by the patentee, prior to his application, was to perfect its mechanism and improve its operation. On the contrary, it seems to
us that it shows that the real purpose in the use was to conduct the business of the manufacture, the improvement and perfection of the machine
being merely incidental and subsidiary.
Id. at 266.
86. Id. at 255-56.
87. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212.
88. Both the Senate and House reports observed:
In 1839, when the period of 2 years was first adopted, it may have been a
proper length of time for an inventor to make up his mind whether or not to
file an application for patent. Under present conditions 2 years appears
unduly long and operates as a handicap to industry. Reduction of the period
would serve to bring the date of patenting closer to the time when the invention is made.
S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1939).
89. Both the Senate and the House reports observed:
The present patent law... specifies that any person who has made an invention not known or used by others before his invention was made may
obtain a patent, but, nevertheless, a patent cannot be obtained if the inven-
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by 1939, Congress and the courts had recognized very different
purposes for the grace period (to allow an inventor time to decide
whether to apply for a patent) and for experimental use negation
of the public use and on sale bars (to allow the inventor an opportunity "to bring the invention to perfection"). Congress and the
courts had also recognized that experimental use negation operated entirely independent of the grace period.
The law of experimental use negation summarized in City of
Elizabeth and Smith & Griggs was applied by the courts for over
100 years with little alteration.9" The law began to change in a
meaningful way, however, soon after the creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. The Federal Circuit adopted as precedent the cases of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of
Claims,9 ' all of which had precedential experimental use cases.92 Although the Federal Circuit expressed serious misgivings
about the law of public use and on sale bars in general,9 3 it

tion... was in public use or on sale in this country, more than 2 years prior
to his application. The law thus permits an inventor, after his invention is
fully completed, to make the invention known to the public for a period of 2
years before filing his applicationfor patent.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. The Supreme Court considered experimental use in four other cases: Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 20 (1939) (stating in dicta that "a
mere experimental use is not the public use defined by the Act"); Root v. Third Ave
R. Co., 146 U.S. 210, 223 (1892) (stating in dicta that "if used under the surveillance of the inventor, and for the purpose of enabling him to test the machine, and
ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended, and make such alterations
and improvements as experience demonstrates to be necessary, it will still be a
mere experimental use, and not a public use, within the meaning of the statute");
Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U.S. 71, 77 (1887) (holding that use of well drills was experimental despite initial success because of need to test invention in different geological settings); and Manning v. Cape Ann Isinglass & Glue Co., 108 U.S. 462, 465
(1883) (holding that use of a process for making gelatin from fish bladders was not
experimental because the inventor made no changes to the process after four years
of unrestricted pre-application use by third parties).
91. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
92. The Court of Claims had considered experimental use in three cases: Gould,
Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Ushakoff v. United States, 327
F.2d 669 (Ct. Cl. 1964); and Binckley v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 444 (1936). The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had considered experimental use in four
cases: In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1957); and In re Josserand,
188 F.2d 486 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
93. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1482-88 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (Rader, J., dissenting) (describing Federal Circuit on sale bar opinions as a
"bewildering and blinding blizzard of instructions," identifying at least three tests
used by the Federal Circuit and collecting negative commentary); TP Lab. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir.) ("Decisions under [the
public use and on sale bars] are marked by confusion and inconsistency."), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit - A Reminis-
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or at least

II. THE LAW OF EXPERIMENTAL USE NEGATION OF THE PUBLIC
USE AND ON SALE BARS
This portion of the paper considers first the nature of experimental use negation as it currently exists under the precedent of
the Federal Circuit. In doing so, it reviews the factors relevant to
experimental use. Finally, it considers the details of proving experimental use.
A. The Nature of Experimental Use
To further the public interest, the law allows inventors the
opportunity9 4 to "perfect" or "complete" their inventions, that is,
to reduce their inventions to practice,9" before applying for a patent.9 6 An inventor's activities which are undertaken to reduce
the invention to practice are referred to as "experimental use" and
are not subject to the on sale or public use bars to patentability.

cence, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 527 (1992) ("I believe there is room for rethinking the policy aspects of several areas of patent law. I would include ... the
on-sale bar").
94. The policy is not to give the inventor time to reduce the invention to practice. The only time period granted in the one-year grace period, which has nothing
to do with experimental use. The confusion between giving the inventor the opportunity to reduce the invention to practice (experimental use) and giving the inventor time to determine whether the invention is worth filing a patent (the one year
grace period) reaches its zenith in the "experimental stage" theory, that "A public
use under § 102(b) does not start the one year period until the invention has left
the experimental stage." Allied Colloids v. American Cyanimid Co., No. 93-1407,
slip op. at 8 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 1995). See generally Welch, supra note 3.
95. "Perfection" and "completion" are synonyms for the stage of an invention
marked by the event of reduction to practice. See American Hide Mach. Co. v.
American Tool & Machine Co., 1 F. Cas. 647, 652 (C.C.D. Mass. 1870) (No. 302);
William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffmann, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use and the On Sale and Public Use Bars to Patentability,63 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1, 7-11 (1988).
96. Experimental use negation does not apply to the printed publication bar of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In re Baxter Travenol Lab., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating under the printed publication bar of Section 102(b), "[t]he fact that [the
author's] system was experimental is irrelevant"); In re Hassler, 347 F.2d 911, 914
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding patentability barred by newspaper article describing experimental version of tobacco curing device); Binckley v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl.
444, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1936) ("What the courts have said upon this subject [experimental use] bears upon the question of public use, and does not apply to a case
where the court is seeking to find whether an alleged improvement has been discovered in a printed publication" (quoting Thacher v. Falmouth, 235 F. 151, 158 (D.
Maine 1916))). Accord Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972)
(holding patent invalid based on publication describing experimental embodiment
even though public use and on sale bars were negated by experimental use).
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Experimental use is said to "negate"9 7 the on sale and public use
bars.
In cataloging the policies underlying the public use and on
sale bars, the Federal Circuit in TP Laboratories identified two
policies operating in favor of the inventor: "the public interest is
also deemed to be served by allowing an inventor time to perfect
his invention, by public testing, if desired, and prepare a patent
application.""8 Of course, the policy allowing an inventor the opportunity to perfect the invention is the policy underlying experimental use negation. 99 Preparation of a patent application, and
consideration of whether to even file an application, are the reasons for the one-year grace period. 00 But the Federal Circuit
has confused these very policies in at least two different ways.
First, in In re Hamilton,10 ' the court suggested that "[t]he
experimental use doctrine operates in the inventor's favor to allow
the inventor to refine his invention or to assess its value relative
to the time and expense of prosecuting a patent application." Suffice it to say that the court was simply wrong in making this
statement. Activities undertaken before the one-year grace period
to assess the value of the invention relative to the time and expense of filing a patent application are not experimental. The
relative expense and time of prosecuting a patent application is irrelevant to experimental use and its underlying policy.
Second, in a line of cases stretching from the 1985 King Instrument case 10 2 to the 1994 Tone Brothers case," 3 the Federal

97. The longstanding debate over whether experimental use is an "exception" or
"negation" of the bar, see Fitz-Gerald, supra note 3, at 586-88, was resolved in TP
Laboratories:experimental use is a negation of the bars, not an exception. TP Lab.
v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 826 (1984). However, the Federal Circuit has referred to experimental use as
an "exception" both before and after TP Laboratories. See In re Smith, 714 F.2d
1127, 1133, 1135-37 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
98. TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 968.
99. See City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137
(1877) (stating "it is in the interest of the public, as well as [the inventor], that the
invention should be perfect and properly tested before a patent is granted for it")
100. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text; General Electric Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (stating there is "a reasonable amount of
time following sales activity (set by statute as one year) to determine whether a
patent is a worthwhile investment"); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571,
580 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (stating the grace period gives the inventor time to prepare and
file the patent application); Barrett, supra note 20, at 735; Rooklidge, supra note
20, at 15-17.
101. 882 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
102. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
103. Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 1356 (1995).
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Circuit listed the policies underlying the section 102(b) bars without including the policy underlying experimental use.1°4 The
Federal Circuit's omission of the policy underlying experimental
use renders its Tone Brothers statement that whether "there was
experimentation occurring is relevant to the question of whether
the activities of the inventor was at odds with any of the four
policies underlying the public use bar""'5 a non-sequitur. Of
course, an activity that would create a public use bar but for its
experimental character would still be "at odds with" the policy
discouraging the removal from the public domain of inventions
that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely
available. 0 6 Likewise, an activity that would create an on sale
bar but for its experimental character would still be "at odds
with" the policy prohibiting the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater than the statutorily
prescribed time.' °7 As a result, whether an activity is experimental has nothing whatsoever to do with whether the activity
violates any of the other policies underlying the bars.
Whether an activity was experimental may be determined by
merely identifying whether the purpose of the activity was primarily to complete or perfect the invention, that is, to reduce the
invention to practice. Granted, this determination can only be
made by considering a number of factual circumstances surrounding the activity, and many of these same circumstances are involved in determining whether a prima facie case has been estab-

104. Commentators have blindly repeated this policy list, omitting any reference
to the policy underlying experimental use. See Thomas K. Landry, Certainty &
Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1163-64 (1994) (citing
UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1025 (1988)).
105. Id.
106. Allied Colloids, slip op. at 5 ("Thus the public use bar of § 102(b) requires
that (1) the invention was used in public and (2) the use was not primarily experimental in purpose"); Rooklidge, supra note 20, at 17-21. The Federal Circuit was
simply wrong in Manville Sales Corp. v. ParamountSystems, Inc., when it stated
that the patentee "did nothing to lead the public to believe its iris arm invention
was in 'the public domain."' 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Despite that "the
invention was mounted atop a 150-foot tall pole in a rest area still closed to the
public, making it very unlikely that the public would even see the new design," the
public still had the possibility of access to an embodiment of the invention before
the critical date. Id. See also Perkins v. Nashua Card & Glazed Paper Co., 2 F.
451, 452 (C.C.D.N.H. 1880) (stating "when the public have had means of
knowledge they have had knowledge of the invention" and "[i]f a pier had been
placed in the bed of a river or a pipe underground, it is conclusively presumed to
be known to all men"). Only if the inventor has taken steps to conceal the invention, would the use avoid violating the policy against detrimental public reliance.
Rooklidge, supra note 20, at 19.
107. Rooklidge, supra note 20, at 22-28.
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lished, that is whether the other policies are implicated. But the
overlap in factors does not mean that there is no separate experimental use inquiry or policy; there is, and there always has been.
1. An Activity Is Experimental If Undertaken to Reduce the
Invention to Practice
To qualify as an experimental use, an activity must be undertaken for the purpose of "perfecting" or "completing" the invention, that is, reducing the invention to practice. Reduction to practice requires that an embodiment meeting all the limitations of
the patent claim be constructed, and that the invention be shown
to be suitable for its intended purpose.' °8 An activity undertaken either to create an embodiment of the invention or show that
the invention is suitable for its intended purpose may qualify as
an experimental use."°
2. Activities Undertaken After Reduction to Practice Cannot Be
Experimental
Because an experimental activity is defined as that undertaken to reduce the invention to practice, an activity occurring after
reduction to practice cannot be an experimental use." ° Therefore, experimental use ends upon reduction to practice."'

108. UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988). Testing is not always required to show reduction to
practice, but when it is, the embodiment must actually work for its intended purpose. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061-64 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Reduction to practice
could be broken down further into four requirements: (1) the invention was embodied in a physical or tangible form; (2) the physical embodiment relied on as a reduction to practice meets every limitation of the claim; (3) the reduction to practice
demonstrated the practicability or utility of the invention to those of ordinary skill
in the art; and (4) the reduction to practice was appreciated by the inventor at the
time it was made. Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 95, at 8.
109. See City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 125,
134-35 (1877).
110. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
1993); RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Gould,
Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 572 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Rooklidge & von Hoffmann,
supra note 95, at 31. Some authors have criticized the Federal Circuit's holding in
RCA that experimental use ends upon reduction to practice. See, e.g., CHISUM,
supra note 6, at § 6.02[7][i] at 6-102 ("The better and prevailing view is that experimental use can indeed continue even after the invention has been completed and
reduced to practice as that term is used in patent law."); JOHN W. SCHLICHER,
PATENT LAW: LEGAL & ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 6.05[7] (1992); David W. Carstens
& Craig A. Nard, Conception and the "On Sale" Bar, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393,
425-26 (1993); Larsen E. Whipsnade & J. Cheever Loophole, Responsiple Advocacy
and Responsible Opinions at the Federal Circuit,35 J.L. & TECH. 331, 340 (1995).
111. See Arthur S. Rose et al., Should Experimental Use End Upon Reduction To
Practice?:Two Divergent Views, 15 NEW MATTER 1, 1 (1990).
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3. The Absence of Reduction to Practice Does Not Render An
Activity Experimental
In the student note that served as the blueprint for the Federal Circuit's on sale bar analysis, the author recognized that "an
inventor needs an opportunity to develop his ideas," and mistakenly drew the conclusion that an invention must be fully completed, that is, reduced to practice, before any selling activity could
create a bar.' But in adopting the policy-based analysis urged
by the student note, the Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the
Court of Claims, ignored this assumption," 3 and the Federal
Circuit later rejected it in UMC Electronics Co. v. United
States."4
The mere fact that the invention has not been reduced to
practice at the time of the activity will not negate application of
the on sale and public use bars if the activity is motivated more
than incidentally by a desire other than to reduce the invention to
practice."' Such activities do not further the policy of allowing
the inventor time to reduce his invention to practice.
4. An Experimental Activity Need Not Be Devoid Of Commercial
Intent
To qualify as an experimental use, an activity must be undertaken "substantially for purposes of experiment."" 6 That is, an
experimental activity is one whose primary purpose is experimentation." 7 Any commercial exploitation must be "merely inciden-

112. Barrett, supra note 20, at 735. The influence of this student note on the
Federal Circuit's public use and on sale bar analysis is considered in Rooklidge,
supra note 20; and Landry, supra note 104.
113. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en banc)
(per curiam).
114. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (rejecting the proposition that application of
the on sale bar requires that the invention be reduced to practice); see also
Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 95, at 3.
115. Lyman v. Maypole, 19 F. 735, 736-37 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1884) (stating "when an
inventor puts his incomplete or experimental device upon the market and sells it,
as a manufacturer, more than two years before he applies for his patent, he gives
to the public the device in the condition or stage of development in which he sells
it."); Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 95, at 43. But see Shatterproof Glass

Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 622-23 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suggesting
that an invention cannot be placed on sale until it is "functional" or "sufficiently
tested to demonstrate that it will work for its intended purpose").
116. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887); Sinskey v.
Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2346 (1993); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
117. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). See U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir.
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8

Because commercial intent underlies virtually every contact
between in investor and a customer, mere customer contact does
not convert an activity into a barring activity 9 Likewise, that
the activity leads to commercial success does not convert an activity into a barring activity. 20
Market testing - that is, attempting to gauge consumer
demand for the invention - does not negate the on sale or public
use bars.' 2 ' The purpose of market testing is commercial exploitation, not experimentation.' 22 Similarly, evaluation of an invention to determine suitability for a customer's application does not
qualify as experimental use.1 23 Market testing and customer
evaluations
are said to be "a trader's, and not an inventor's exper1 24
iment."

The extent of commercial exploitation is critical in determining whether activities conducted as part of clinical trials or other
regulatory testing negate an on sale or public use bar. 25 For ex1990) (collecting cases); Grain Processing Corp v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840
F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at 1563-64; In re Smith, 714
F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
118. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 550; Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona,
Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating "primary motive ... was...
commercial"); Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731
F.2d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that "commercial exploitation is merely
incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation") (quoting In re Theis, 610
F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1979)); In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1399 n.5 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (stating "experimental use may involve incidental income"). See U.S. Envtl.,
911 F.2d at 716; Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at 1563-64. As the Federal Circuit explained
in Allied Colloids, "Commercial purposes underlies virtually every contact between
inventor and potential customer. When testing an invention entails customer contact, that does not convert an otherwise experimental purpose into a public use."
Slip op. at 6.
119. Allied Colloids, slip op. at 6.
120. Id. at 9.
121. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that testing was
geared toward marketing and only incidentally toward technological development
where the dominant purpose was to determine whether potential consumers would
buy the product and how much they would pay for it); In re Josserand, 188 F.2d
486, 491-94 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("The experimentation in this regard was indulged to
see if public patronage could be attracted - not for the purpose of testing the
structure"). Schainholz, supra note 3 (arguing that the prohibition against precritical date market testing is too strict).
122. In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1135.
123. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1074 (holding that "testing' of a device to determine
suitability for a customer's particular (unclaimed) need is not experimental use");
In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 792-93 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding that a sale was not experimental because "six month evaluation" notation on invoices "was for the benefit
of the customer, who would want to know if the system suited his purposes").
124. In re Theis, 610 F.2d at 793 (citing Smith & Davis Mfg. Co. v. Mellon, 58 F.
705, 707 (8th Cir. 1893)).
125. See generally Eric M. Lee, Public Use and On Sale Issues Arising from Clin-
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ample, although the TP Laboratories inventor used his claimed
tooth positioning orthodontic appliance on three patients more
than one year before filing his patent application, charged two of
the patients for the services and made no changes to the invention
as a result of the uses, the Federal Circuit held that these three
uses were not a public use. 12' The Federal Circuit focused on the
fact that the inventor retained control over the tooth positioners
through his relationship with his patients and kept meticulous
records on the patients' progress. Because the inventor did not
offer to sell any of the tooth positioners to other orthodontists and
charged his patients only for his services in installing the appliances, any commercial benefit from use of the particular claimed
appliances was merely incidental to the primary purpose of testing the invention to determine whether it worked for its intended
27
purpose.1
On the other hand, in ParagonPodiatry, the Federal Circuit
held that the sale of more than 300 orthotic devices before the
critical date constituted an on sale bar.12 The court viewed the
number of orthotic devices sold as much less significant than the
fact that the sales were made in an ordinary commercial environment, outside the control of the inventor. 129 Accordingly, the primary purpose of the sales was commercial, not experimental. 130
Similarly, in Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit held that sale before the critical date of an embodiment of
the invention under a temporary permit issued by the Environmental Protection Agency did constitute an on sale bar. In
Pennwalt, the accused infringer sold the claimed aqueous suspension for an insecticide to some customers before the critical date.
The EPA regulations under which the permit was issued restricted the temporary permit to use in experimental programs. Although he supplied the suspension that was sold, the inventor had
no control over the subject sales, which were primarily for commercial purposes.112 Because the goal of the activity was com-

ical Testing of Medical Devices, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 364 (1993).
126. 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at 972-73.
128. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1185 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)
129. Id. at 1187-88.
130. Likewise, the Federal Circuit held in Sinskey v. Pharmacia Opthalmics,
Inc., that the inventor's sale and implantation of a few intraocular lenses before
the critical date was not experimental principally because the inventor testified
that after the first implantation, no testing was necessary to demonstrate that the
invention would work for its intended purpose. 982 F.2d 494, 502 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
131. 740 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
132. The Federal Circuit observed:
Pennwalt's primary motive in seeking an EPA temporary permit was for the
commercial purpose of recovering developmental expenses and testing the
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mercialization and market testing, the Federal Circuit held that
the invention had been placed on sale.' 33
Conducting an activity as part of clinical trials or other regulatory testing does not establish that the activity was experimental use. In order for experimental use to negate an on sale or
.public use bar, the inventor must conduct the activity primarily
for the purpose of experiment. In other words, the inventor's primary purpose must have been to show that the invention was
suitable for its intended purpose.
B. The Factors Relevant to Experimental Use
As Justice Cardozo recognized, the majority of cases "turn not
upon the rule of law, but upon its application to the facts." 34
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has often said that the determination of whether an activity is experimental is based on "the totality of the circumstances."' 35 The Federal Circuit's use of the totality of the circumstances "rule" in this regard has often been
criticized. 36 But by reviewing the circumstances in light of the
precedential experimental use cases, whether a particular activity
is experimental is often clear. In Justice Cardozo's words, the majority of these cases "could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one."'37
The circumstances relevant to experimental use include:
whether payment was accepted; 38 whether public testing was
necessary; 39 whether the length of the test period was appropri-

market. Manufacturing data collected under the temporary permit were
used by Pennwalt to set a sales prices and a gross margin goal for sales of
its suspension.
Id. at 1581
133. Id.
134. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 163 (1921).
135. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir.
1990); U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed Cir. 1990); In re
Brigance,.792 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
136. See, e.g., Jorgenson, supra note 3; Landry, supra note 104; R. Carl Moy,
JurisprudentialImplications of the Federal Circuit's Decisions Regarding the OnSale Bar, address at ABAIALI Advanced Course of Study, "Patent Law and Litigation" 3 (Dec. 4, 1992) (describing the totality of the circumstances approach as "the
legal-reasoning equivalent of a Ouija Board").
137. CARDOZO, supra note 134, at 164.
138. E.g. Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902,
906 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
139. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 551 (holding use of luminary assembly on 150foot tall outdoor lighting pole experimental); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding use of gravel packer in oil
and gas wells experimental); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724
F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir.) (holding use of orthodontia device in mouths of patients
experimental), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
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ate;140 whether progress records were kept;"' whether the inventor can introduce objective evidence of experimental intent; 4 2 whether the alleged experimental activities were aimed
at claimed features of the device;"' and whether the inventor
retained control over the activity.' This list is not necessarily
exhaustive, and the Federal Circuit does not require the lower
tribunal to review each factor."
1. Public Testing Does Not PrecludeA Findingof
Experimental Use
The fact that an invention was tested in an area open to the
public is not dispositive of the experimental use issue. 4' Nonsecret use is not ipso facto "public use" activity.14 ' That is, a use
in public is not necessarily a public use."
The inherent nature of certain inventions mandates that the
testing be performed in an area open to the public.14 ' For exam-

140. Grain Processing,840 F.2d at 906 (holding activity experimental where "the
testing period was short"); Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at 1564 (holding of non-experimental use reversed where testing period was six months).
141. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,
1071-74 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating no experimental use where no progress records
kept); U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating no experimental use where no progress records kept).
142. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1072 (holding offers and uses non-experimental because of "the absence of any objective evidence that such use was experimental");
U.S. Enutl., 911 F.2d at 717 ("The subjective belief of inventors or customers, however, must be weighed against objective evidence which indicates otherwise").
143. In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Smith, 714 F.2d
1127, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1979).
144. U.S. Envtl., 911 F.2d at 717-18 (stating "lack of control over the operation of
the beds is strong evidence of commercial purpose"); In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d
1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that "for an assertion of experimental use to
have merit, it must be clear that the inventor kept control over his invention in the
course of its testing"); Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at 1564 (continued control by the inventor of the invention while in the hands of the purchaser); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter
Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1137 (stating
there is no experimental use where tests are conducted by consumers "in their own
homes without legal restriction").
145. Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108; Ricon Corp. v. Adaptive Driving Systems, Inc.,
No. 86-1352 (Fed. Cir. June 26, 1987) (unpublished) ("In none of our section 102(b)
cases have we created a list of incantations which the district court must utter to
ward off reversal on appeal. Certain circumstances may render any one or all of
the factors listed in our cases irrelevant in applying section 102(b).").
146. TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
147. Id.
148. City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement, Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-35
(1877).
149. See, e.g., id. (finding that pavement cannot be experimented upon satisfactorily except on a public highway); Allied Colloids, slip op. at 7 (on-site testing of
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pie, in Manville Sales Corp. v. ParamountSystems, 5 ' the Federal Circuit held that a use in public was experimental because it
was necessary for the inventor to determine whether the invention, an outdoor light, could operate in the environment for which
it was designed, a Wyoming winter. 5'
In order to ascertain whether an invention will work for its
intended purpose, the law recognizes that testing may encompass
or even require disclosure to the public, without barring the
inventor's access to the patent system. 5 2 The extent
of the pub53
lic testing relates to the nature of the invention. 1
2. The Length of the Test Period and the Number of Tests Should
Correspond to the Nature of the Invention
The length of the test period and the number of tests performed are also relevant in determining whether the use was
experimental." The length of the testing period should relate to
the amount of time necessary to test the invention adequately, 155 and the number of tests performed should correspond to
the level necessary to verify that the invention is operable for its
intended purpose.156
The mere fact that the number of sales, offers or uses is limited may be relevant to determining whether the scope of the
testing was appropriate, but only where other evidence indicates
that the purpose of the activities was experimental.'57 The limited extent of the activity does not alone negate the bars. 5 ' Indeed, even a single sale, offer or use may invalidate a patent under the on sale or public use bars.'59

fresh sewage was needed).
150. 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
151. Likewise, in Grain Processing, the court held that testing by third party
manufacturers was an experimental use because it was necessary to determine the
interaction between the inventor's food product and other manufacturers' products.
840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
152. Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
153. Id. at 1564.
154. See, e.g., Grain Processing, 840 F.2d at 906; Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at 1564; In
re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1986); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971-72 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
155. City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135
(1877). See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys. Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 551 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
156. Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108; TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 972.
157. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1188 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
158. Id.
159. Id.; A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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3. ProgressRecords May Evidence Experimental Use
In determining whether the use of the invention was experimental, the court will also consider whether records of the test
procedures and results were kept. 6 ° Progress records serve as
persuasive evidence of an inventor's experimental relationship
with a customer, despite a sale of the invention. 6 ' On the other
hand, the lack of written progress records will usually be considered as circumstantial evidence of a non-experimental pur-

pose. 162
4. The Inventor's Later-Expressed Subjective Intent Is of
Little Value
The inventor's subjective intent to experiment, if expressed
for the first time after institution of litigation, is generally of little
value in determining whether an activity was experimental." 3
When sales are made in an ordinary commercial environment,
placing the goods outside the inventor's control, an inventor's
secretly-held subjective intent to "experiment," even if true, is
unavailing without objective evidence to support the
contention. 164
This is not to say that the inventor's intent is irrelevant. The
Federal Circuit in Paragon Podiatry, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories,
Inc. 6 5 confused the role of the inventor's intent in affirming a
summary judgment of invalidity under the on sale bar. The Paragon Podiatry holding should have been simple: the inventor's
declaration of his experimental intent is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact in the face of overwhelming objective evidence that the 300 pre-critical date sales were made for a
commercial purpose. Instead, the Court reasoned that the

160. See, e.g., Allied Colloids, slip op. at 9; LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1992); U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc.
v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108; TP Lab.,
724 F.2d at 972; In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
161. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1071.
162. U.S. Envtl., 911 F.2d at 717.
163. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1071-72 (stating that "an inventor's intent is immaterial when objective evidence points otherwise") (quoting Harrington Mfg. Co. v.
Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1481 n.3. (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also Brigance, 792
F.2d at 1108; TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 972; In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir.
1983). But see Moxness Prods. v. Xomed, 891 F.2d 890, 891-92 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(overturning grant of JNOV and remanding for new trial where testimony of coinventors conflicted over similar issue).
164. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1072; Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108.
165. 984 F.2d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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inventor's intent was not a "material" fact. 16 6 Given that the primary inquiry regarding experimental use negation is the purpose
of the activity, however, intent is not only material, it is controlling.
5. Whether Payment Was Accepted for the Activity May Indicate
Commercial, Not Experimental, Intent
The absence of any payment suggests that the activity was
conducted for the benefit of the inventor.' 67 Payment for an embodiment of the invention may indicate commercial exploitation,
but the mere fact that payment was made does not preclude a
finding that the sale was experimental. 6 ' A court will examine
the circumstances surrounding the payment to determine whether
the primary purpose of the transaction was experimental. 69 A
sale made because the purchaser was participating in experimental testing may further the policy of allowing the inventor the
opportunity to reduce the invention to practice. 7 °
The amount of the payment made for an embodiment of the
invention may indicate the purpose behind the transaction.' 7 ' A
sale for full price may affect a court's decision to view the pay72
ment as a barring sale rather than as an experimental use.
Reimbursement to the inventor for only the cost of the embodiment does not, however, necessarily indicate experimental
use. 173 Although losing money on an activity may evidence experimental purpose, it may just as well suggest a losing business
proposition. 74

166. Id. at 1188.
167. Allied Colloids, slip op. at 9.
168. Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(concluding that payment does not constitute a per se bar under § 102(b)); TP Lab.,
724 F.2d at 972.
169. For example, the Federal Circuit has held that a conditional sale, subject to
the invention's satisfactory performance, was experimental where the patentee
treated the device sold as an experiment. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Similarly, the Court of Claims has held
sales experimental because the profit motive "was merely incidental to the overriding experimental purpose." Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669, 672 (Ct. Cl.
.1964).
170. See UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (dictum); Great N. Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 165 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
171. Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at 1564. See also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
172. In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
173. U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990). But
see Ushakoff, 327 F.2d at 672.
174. See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d
831, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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A money-back guarantee will not necessarily establish an
experimental relationship between the parties. 175 A money-back
guarantee is a typical commercial sales provision and may indicate an ordinary 176commercial-type transaction, rather than an
experimental use.
6. Changes Resulting from the Activity May Suggest an
Experimental Purpose
To be experimental, an activity need not result in changes to
the invention. 177 Conversely, where the activity results in failure
and necessitates change in the design of the invention, the activity may well be assumed to be experimental.178 But this argument usually fails, including the first time it was raised in a
precedential opinion, the Supreme Court's 1887 opinion in Smith
& Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague.179 There, the trial court
had held the uses experimental where, after the uses, the inventor
had made changes to the machine that "enabled the inventor to
take the final step between partial and complete success." 8 ' The
Supreme Court rejected this holding because the changes were not
part of the claimed invention,' 8 ' but the Court's dicta
gave pros2
ponents of experimental use some encouragement.
Of course, changes to the claimed invention made by the
inventor, after, and as a result of, the activity do not conclusively
establish that the activity was motivated by an experimental
purpose.'83 In In re Theis,'" the Court of Custom and Patent
Appeals rejected the "changes" argument, at least in part, 185 on
curious reasoning: because the problems encountered "were solvable by routine debugging, setup and installation adjustments"
and were in fact "solved without the need to change any of the
major functional blocks of the system."" 6 The court's focus on
the quality of the changes - that they did not require "an
inventor's skills, but rather the skills of a competent techni-

175. See LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1074.
176. Id.
177. City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135
(1877).
178. See Great N. Corp., 782 F.2d at 165 (noting that the pre-critical date uses
were all failures).
179. 123 U.S. 249, 255 (1887).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 255-56.
182. Id. at 255 ("We think this view might be correct.").
183. In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
184. Id.
185. The primary reason for rejecting the argument was that the changes were
to other than the claimed invention. Id. at 792-93.
186. Id.
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cian"5 7 - seems misplaced. Absent hindsight, the inventor's
tinkering with the invention during the activity is circumstantial
evidence of experimental intent. 188 Changes to the claimed invention resulting from the activity, regardless of their nature,
should be circumstantial evidence of experimental purpose.
7. An Activity Directed to Something Other Than the Claimed
Invention Cannot Be Experimental

An attempt to perfect something other than the claimed invention in a device that embodies the invention will not qualify as
an experimental use because the activity was not undertaken to
reduce the invention to practice. 189 Reduction to practice means
reduction to practice of the claimed invention.'9" Experimentation directed to a portion of the machine or a system other than
the claimed invention will not negate as experimental commercialization or use of a machine or system incorporating the claimed
invention.19 For this same reason, testing of a device to determine suitability for a customer's particular (unclaimed) needs is
not experimental.192 Likewise, testing of an "unclaimed
ele194
ment"'93 of a combination invention will not negate the bar.
Design patents should be subject to experimental use negation of the public use and on sale bars as long as the experimentation relates to reducing the claimed invention to practice. In a
design patent, the claimed invention is the ornamental design
shown in the patent drawing. 9 Unlike the invention of a utility
187. Id.
188. Cf City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 133
(1877) (holding that an inventor examining a pavement invention almost daily,
tapping it with his cane and inquiring about it, constituted experimental use).
189. See, e.g., Smith & Griggs Mfg., Co. v. Sprauge, 123 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1887);
RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (1989) (collecting Federal Circuit cases); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Smith, 714
F.2d 1103, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
190. UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
191. Smith & Griggs, 123 U.S. at 255-56; RCA, 887 F.2d at 1061-62; Brigance,
792 F.2d at 1109.
192. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,
1074 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 792-93 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
193. Of course, the Federal Circuit is using sloppy language when it refers to an
"unclaimed element." Inventions, not elements, are claimed. General Foods Corp. v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992). ("It cannot
be said - though it often is, incorrectly, by the uninitiated - that a part of a
claim is 'claimed' subject matter."). Also, the court should heed its own advice to
focus on claim limitations, not elements. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
194. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This holding of In re
Smith, that tests of fragrance strength were of an "unclaimed element," is surprising because one element of the carpet deodorizer invention was "a volatile odorous
agent." Id. at 1129.
195. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The claim [of a design
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patent, the invention of a design patent is reduced to practice
when the design is embodied in an article.'9 6 Thus, experimental
use of an invention of a design patent should be limited to activities leading to the production of an article embodying the design.
For example, an inventor may need to turn to someone else to
produce the first article embodying the invention. But, once that
article is produced, the invention would be reduced to practice,
and no further activities should be characterized as experimental
use.
In an opinion that is only five paragraphs long, the Federal
Circuit in In re Mann197 considered whether display of an ornamental table at a trade show could constitute experimental use of
the design embodied in the table. The court rejected the experimental use assertion, holding that "[obtaining the reactions of
people to a design -

whether or not they like it -

is not

'experimentation' in that sense." 98 This holding is unassailable.
But the Mann court did not stop there. Instead, it went on to
explain that "[tihe only use possible for an ornamental design is
its embodiment, exhibition, and observation." 99 Per the court,
"[wle see no way in which an ornamental design for an article of
manufacture can be subject to the 'experimental, use' exception
applicable in the case of functioning machines, manufactures, or
processes."2" This dicta overlooks, of course, activities in the
production of the first article embodying the claimed design.
One district court soon questioned the sweeping dicta of
Mann, suggesting that an activity involving the invention of a design patent could be experimental where the activity was directed
to determining whether the claimed design was suitable for its
intended purpose and that purpose involved the appearance of the
article embodying the claimed design.2"' This suggestion was in-

patent] is limited to what is shown in the application drawings."); 37 C.F.R. §
1.153(a) (1995) ("The claim shall be in formal terms to the ornamental design for
the article ...as shown, or as shown and described.").
196. Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 765-66 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Dietrich v. Leaf,
87 F.2d 226, 229 (C.C.P.A. 1937).
197. 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.

201. In IKO Chicago Inc. v. Certain Teed Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1953 (N.D. Ill.
1993), the patentee had installed asphalt composition shingles on an employee's
home to determine whether the shingle roof looked like a shake roof when installed. The district court denied summary judgment on the public use bar arising
from that activity on the basis that the use could have been experimental. The
district court asserted that installing the shingles could qualify as experimental in
that the inventor needed to install the shingles to determine whether they would
work for their intended purpose: resembling a shake roof when installed: 'This
testing was not done to see whether consumers liked the appearance of the roof
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correct. The court failed to appreciate that reduction to practice of
the invention of a design patent does not require that the claimed
invention be shown to work for its intended purpose. The Federal
Circuit revisited its Mann dicta in Tone Brothers, Inc. v. Sysco
Corp.202 In rejecting the Mann dicta, however, the court made
the situation worse.
The district court in Tone Brothers2 3 felt bound by the
Mann dicta, characterizing that dicta as an indication of how the
Federal Circuit intended to treat design cases in the future and as
an express direction to district courts." 4 The district court invalidated a design patent for "the ornamental design for a jar or
similar article."0 5 The Federal Circuit reversed the district
court in Tone Brothers and renounced its Mann dicta.0 6
The Federal Circuit accepted the district court's finding that
the public display of the jar was for the purpose of evaluating the
"functional" features of the jar's ornamental design.20 7 But the
Tone Brothers court distinguished its Mann decision and explicitly
held that "experimentation directed to the functional features of a
product also containing an ornamental design may negate what
otherwise would be considered a public use within the meaning of
section 102(b)."2 °8 Characterizing the activity as undertaken for
"determining whether the design's functional aspects have any
adverse effect on users of the structure embodying the design,"2 ° the court determined that the activity could well have

but to determine whether the design accomplished its intended purpose of simulating the depth and dimensionality of more expensive roofing materials." Id. at 1955.
Although IKO Chicago suggested that the Mann dicta was perhaps overbroad, it
rode roughshod over the distinction between the claimed invention (the shingle)
and the thing whose appearance was tested (the roof). See Keystone Retaining
Wall Systems, Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450-51 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between the infringement analysis of a design patent on a retaining
wall block and such analysis of entire wall).
202. 28 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1356 (1995).
203. Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1184 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
204. Id. at 1188.
205. Id.
206. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1200.
207. Id. at 1199. First, the Federal Circuit noted that "the display of the design . . . appears to have been for the purpose of evaluating the effect of the functional features of the design on the typical functioning of a spice container." Id.
Then, the court observed that "itappears that the showing was for the purpose of
testing the functional features of the design." Id. The testing consisted of giving
the jars to students and asking them "how the containers felt when shaking out
their contents." Id.
208. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1200. Lest the reader miss the holding, the court repeated "As a matter of law, experimentation directed to functional features of a
product to which an ornamental design relates may negate what otherwise would
be a public use within the meaning of section 102(b)." Id.
209. Id. at 1199.
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been experimental:
Patentable designs may embody functional features. Such appears
to be the case here. Thus.... we do not think applicable to this
case the settled law on utility patents that experimentation performed with respect to non-claimed features of a device cannot ne-

gate the effect of activities that would otherwise bar patentability
under section 102(b).21°

By this statement, the Federal Circuit most likely meant that the
Tone Brothers activity, unlike the Mann activity, somehow related
to the claimed invention.2 1' In other words, the tests were conducted on features of the claimed ornamental design, albeit functional attributes of those ornamental features. But the Tone
Brothers activity - display of a jar "directed toward determining
whether the design's functional aspects have any adverse effect on
the typical functioning of a spice container" 21 2 - could not have
been conducted for the purpose of reducing the claimed invention
of the ornamental jar design to practice. That invention had already been reduced to practice. Therefore, the opportunity for
213
experimental use was lost.

210. Id. at 1199 n.5 (citations omitted).
211. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1199 n.5. This passage could also be read as implying
that only utility patents are subject to the principle that experimental use must be
performed with respect to the claimed invention. This reading is somewhat unlikely, however, because the Federal Circuit identified no reason why this principle
should be confined to utility patents. Congress and the Patent and Trademark
Office have been reluctant to treat design patents differently from utility patents.
35 U.S.C. § 171 (1995) ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided."); 37 C.F.R. §
1.151 (1995) ("The rules relating to applications for other inventions or discoveries
are also applicable to applications for patents for designs except as otherwise provided."). Moreover, the Federal Circuit said that the rule did not apply to "this
case," not design patents in general. Tone Bros., F.3d at 1199-1200.
212. Id. at 1199.
213. The Federal Circuit focused on a distinction between the Tone Brothers activity and the Mann activity which suggests that the Court does not quite understand the policies underlying the bars. The court relied on the commercial nature
of the Mann activity: "The display of the design in Mann, unlike the display in the
present case, appears to have been for a purpose directly contrary to the public use
bar policy of preventing an extension of the patent term through pre-application
commercial exploitation." Id. But the policy against pre-application commercialization underlies the on sale bar, not the public use bar. Rooklidge, supra note 20, at
22-28. The policy underlying the public use bar is the policy against detrimental
public reliance. Id. at 17-21. This policy was clearly violated by the Tone Brothers
activity; the pre-critical date use of an article embodying the claimed design by
third parties under no obligation of secrecy. See, e.g., Manning v. Cape Ann Isinglass & Glue Co., 108 U.S. 462, 465 (1883); Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336
(1881). See also Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 682 (7th
Cir. 1977) (holding that patent was invalid under public use bar for trade show
display); Construction Specialties, Inc. v. Arden Architectural Specialties, Inc., 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1878 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that patent was invalid under pub-
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The Federal Circuit needs to revisit application of experimental use negation to activities involving embodiments of inventions
claimed in design patents. In particular, the court needs to recognize that activities conducted after the claimed design has been
embodied in an article cannot be conducted for the purpose of
reducing the claimed invention to practice. Accordingly, those
214
activities cannot give rise to experimental use negation.
8. At Least in the Case of A Sale, the PurchaserMay Need to
Know That the Activity Is Experimental
The Federal Circuit has suggested that the customer, at least
in the case of a sale or offer to sell, must be made aware of the
experimental nature of the activity.215 The inventor's failure to
communicate experimental purpose to any of the purchasers or
prospective purchasers of a device embodying the invention may
be fatal to a claim of experimental use.216 At the very least, it is
circumstantial evidence that the purpose of the activity was not
primarily experimental.
9. Secrecy of the Activity Suggests That It Is Experimental
If a person other than the inventor uses the invention to
conduct the alleged experiments, the court may also consider
whether the user was obligated to maintain secrecy.217 A
customer's agreement to use a device secretly may be introduced
as evidence to show an inventor's experimental purpose despite a
sale of the invention.21 8
lic use bar for trade show display); Whistler Corp. v. Dynascan Corp., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1647, 1650 (N.D. 111. 1989) (holding that patent was invalid under public use bar for trade show display); Michael D. Kaminski & Lawrence M. Sung, The
Legal Significance of Trade Show Activity Under United States Patent Law, 76 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 445, 460-65 (1994) (reviewing cases).
214. See supra Part II(A)(1)(a).
215. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed.
Cir. 1993). The court noted, "Further, we have held that the assertion of experimental sales, at a minimum, requires that customers must be made aware of the
experimentation." Id. See also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1401
(C.C.P.A. 1975). The Federal Circuit has not, however, adopted the Ninth Circuit's
rule that requires an express provision in the contract of sale representing that the
sale is made primarily for an experimental purpose. MELVIN L. HALPERN, DISCUSSION OF JURISDICTION AND HIGHLIGHTED CASES IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982-1990 221, 241 (1991).

216. ParagonPodiatry,984 F.2d at 1186; LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1072; Dybel, 524
F.2d at 1401.
217. See, e.g., Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1986); TP Lab., Inc. v.
Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
826 (1984).
218. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1071; see also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
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10. An Experimental Activity Must Be Conducted By the Inventor
or By One Under His Direction
The fact that the inventor is not the person conducting the
experiments will not be dispositive of the experimental use issue.
In order to invoke experimental use negation of the bars, however,
the activity must have been performed by the inventor or one
"under his direction." 219 "In other words, the inventor must keep
the invention under his own control."22 ° An inventor's lack of
control over the testing is strong evidence of commercial purpose,
rather than experimental use.22'
The Federal Circuit has rejected an assertion of experimental
use when neither the inventor nor his assignee or employer were
involved in the alleged experiments by their customers. 222 This
result makes sense because the policy of allowing the inventor the
opportunity to reduce the invention to practice is not furthered by
activities of one other than the inventor or one under his direction.223
Control, however, is a matter of degree. A court may hold
that an inventor without testing facilities maintained control if he
submits a sample to a third party for testing and receives a report
of the test results. 224 But these instances have been carefully
limited to those where the tests were necessary to establish the
utility of the invention.225

Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
219. For example, in Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, the Federal Circuit
rejected the patentee's argument that distribution of samples of the invention was
for experimental purposes. 739 F.2d 587, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The court stated
that the activity could not have been experimental because the invention was out
of the hands of the inventor and any testing was not "under his direction." Id. See
also Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 257 (1887); City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877). Cf supra notes
217-18 and accompanying text.
220. City of Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 136; see also Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at
1187; In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
221. U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the patentee's lack of control over the activity "is strong evidence of commercial purpose"). See also LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1071; Baker Oil, 828 F.2d at
1564; Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108; Smith, 714 F.2d at 1135.
222. Hamilton, 882 F.2d at 1581.
223. See General Elec., 654 F.2d at 62 & n.U; 1 MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT
LAW PERSPECTIVES § 2.3[7.-6] (2d ed. 1990); Charles F. Pigott, The Concepts of
Public Use and Sale, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SoCY 399, 419 (1967).
224. See Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Armco, Inc. v. Cyclops Corp., 791 F.2d 147, 150-51 (Fed. Cir 1986);
Veenstra, supra note 3, at 855-56.
225. See Grain Processing, 840 F.2d at 906; Armco, 791 F.2d at 150-51.
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11. An Activity of A Third Party Unrelated to the Inventor Cannot
Be Experimental
It seems apparent that an inventor may not avoid application
of a bar based on an unrelated third party's activity on the ground
that the third party's purpose was experimental.226 Nor is there
any reason to label activity by a third party whom the inventor
has placed in possession of the invention as experimental.2 27
C. Proving Experimental Use
Perhaps the biggest change wrought by the Federal Circuit in
the law of experimental use involves how experimental use is
proven, including: the burden of proof or persuasion, the burden of
going forward, the standard of proof and the fact/law nature of
experimental use. Often an overlooked factor, the burden of proof
or persuasion can have important consequences. 228 The standard
of proof can have a great effect at trial, and the fact/law nature of

226. Eg., Magnetics, Inc. v. Arnold Eng'g Co., 438 F.2d 72, 74 (7th Cir. 1971)
(stating experimental use cannot negate public use bar based on activities of two
unrelated third parties); Bourne v. Jones, 207 F.2d 173, 173 (5th Cir. 1953), adopting 114 F. Supp. 413, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1951) ("Experimental use was not meant to
enable an inventor to profit by experimental efforts of others not within his control
or direction."), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); Atlas Chem. Indus. v. Moraine
Prods., 350 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (stating experimental use by unrelated third party cannot negate on sale or public use bar), affd in relevant part,
rev'd on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1974); 2 ANTHONY W. DELLER,
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 695 (2d ed. 1964); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2121 (1989). Contra Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (holding third party experimental use negated bar).
227. In Creative Mfg. v. Unik, the Federal Circuit held that sales made to a close
friend can raise the on-sale bar. 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1064, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(nonprecedential). Such sales violate the policy against preapplication commercialization. Id. The mere fact that the sales were made to a close friend does not necessarily render them experimental. Id. There is no "close friend negation" of the onsale bar. Id. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
228. RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 3 (1992)
("The burden of proof is a ubiquitous device whose wider influence on litigation has
been curiously ignored by legal commentators"). Gaskins observes that once the
distinction between the burden of going forward and the burden of proof (risk of
non-persuasion") is made, 'the burden of proof concept fades into the footnotes." Id.
at 21. He also points out the important, often determinative, nature of the burden
of proof:
Where persuasion requires the jury to build complex inferences, influenced
as much by group psychology as by inductive reasoning, the risk of nonpersuasion becomes a heavy burden indeed. The honorable path for a zealous seeker of favorable legal results is to try to shift that burden to the adversary whenever possible. That way your client wins, unless the opposing
party can somehow make an affirmative case for a different version of the
facts.
Id. at 26-27.
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the question determines the standard of review, which can have a
great effect on appeal.

1. The Burden of Going Forwardwith Proofof Experimental Use
The proponent of experimental use bears the burden of going
forward with clear and convincing evidence of an experimental
purpose underlying the activity. As the Federal Circuit held in
Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co.:229 "Once a prima facie case of public use before the critical date has been made, the patent owner
must come forward
with clear and convincing evidence to counter
23 0
that showing."

2. The "Burden of Proofof Experimental Use"
In Smith & Griggs, the Supreme Court placed the burden of
proof (or "risk of nonpersuasion) 2 1 squarely on the proponent of
experimental use, in that case the patentee:
In considering the evidence as to the alleged prior use... ,which if
established, will have the effect of invalidating the patent, and
where the defense is met only by the allegation that the use was
not a public use in the sense of the statute, because it was for the
purpose of perfecting an incomplete invention by tests and experiments, the proof, on the part of the patentee, the period covering
the use having been
clearly established, should be full, unequivocal
232
and convincing.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals interpreted this passage as placing the burden of proof on the patent applicant as
well.233
But the Federal Circuit revised this interpretation in In re
Smith: "[w]here, as here, the inventor made the allegedly public
use, he has the burden of going forward with convincing evidence
that the public use activities fall within the experimental use

229. 740 F.2d 1529, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
230. Id. The cases involving the burden of going forward and burden of proof on
experimental use are collected in Douglas W. Wyatt, The Burden of ProofRegarding "Experimental Use" in Connection With a Potential "On Sale" or "Public Use"
Statutory Bar to Patentability Under 35 U.S.C. Section 102(b), in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAw (1985).
231. Federal Rule of Evidence 301 refers to the burden of proof as "the risk of
nonpersuasion" and points out that burden "remains throughout trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast." FED. R. EVID. 301.
232. 123 U.S. 249, 264 (1887).
233. In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ("The Court also held that,

once public use or sale before the critical date has been established, the burden is
on the patentee to prove that such use was experimental by full, unequivocal, and
convincing proof"). See also In re Josserand, 188 F.2d 486, 491 (C.C.P.A. 1951)
(placing burden on patent applicant).
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exception." 23 In TP Laboratories, the Federal Circuit confirmed
that'the burden of going forward, and not the ultimate burden of
persuasion or proof, rests on the proponent of experimental
use. 235 In TP Laboratories, the district court had invalidated the
patent because the patentee had not carried the "heavy burden 23of
6
showing that the public use was bona fide experimentation."
The TP Laboratoriespanel observed that 35 U.S.C. § 282 permanently places the burden of proof of facts necessary to a conclusion
of invalidity on the party attacking the patent's validity, 237 and
that there are not two separate issues (was it public use and was
it experimental) but one (was it public use under section 102(b)?)
and then concluded: "Under this analysis, it is incorrect to impose
on the patent owner.. . the burden of proving that a 'public use'
was 'experimental.'" 238 The TP Laboratories panel went on to explain its holding:
This does not mean, of course, that the challenger has the burden of
proving that the use is not experimental. Nor does it mean that the
patent owner is relieved of explanation. It means that if a prima
facie case is made of public use, the patent owner must be able to
point to or must come forward with convincing evidence to counter
that showing.239
By its analysis of presumption of validity, burden of proof, standard of proof, exception and negation, the TP Laboratoriespanel
apparently meant that the proponent of invalidity bears the burden to establish facts supporting the conclusion of the on sale or
public use bar by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the
burden of going forward with evidence of facts establishing a
prima facie case of the on sale or public use bar. If the proponent
of experimental use so desires, it can rebut that case by going
forward with evidence that the activity was experimental. 2"
234. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
235. TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed.Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
236. Id. at 969-70.
237. Id. This is but an application of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See supra note 231 for the text of Rule 301.
238. TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971. By the same reasoning, because the patentee
bears the burden of proving infringement, an accused infringer would not bear the
burden of proving affirmative defenses. However, the accused infringer does bear
that burden.
239. Id. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court explained that
"although the.., presumption [created by the prima facie case] shifts the burden
of production to the defendant, '[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact ... remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). If the
defendant carries its burden of production, the Court explained, "the presumption
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted ... and drops from the case." Id. The
plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact. Id. at 2747-48.
240. Whether the proponent of experimental use has the burden of proof on that
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Once the proponent of experimental use has done so, per the TP
Laboratories panel, "the court should [look] at all of the evidence
put forth by both parties and [decide] whether the entirety of the
evidence led to the conclusion that there [has] been a 'public
use. ' "241 Under the TP Laboratories analysis, the clear and convincing standard of proof for experimental use seems to evaporate
and the burden of proof or persuasion is borne by the accused infringer or the Patent and Trademark Office.
Not only does the burden of proof of experimental use seem
to evaporate, but the entire experimental use issue may have
evaporated along with it, swallowed up into the totality of the
circumstances and the conclusion of the bar itself. In Harrington
Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co.,242 the Federal
Circuit interpreted TP Laboratoriesas eliminating the experimental use inquiry as an inquiry separate from the public use
bar.2"
TP Laboratoriesgenerated a relatively large amount of commentary, very little of which was positive. 2 " One reason for the
negative reaction was the TP Laboratories panel's treatment of
the Supreme Court's Smith & Griggs holding.24 In a footnote,
TP Laboratories distinguished Smith & Griggs as predating the
1952 Patent Act, apparently contending that the Supreme Court's
holding was overruled by the codification of the presumption of
validity.24' The TP Laboratories court did not address the prece-

issue has long been subject to debate. Compare Austin Mach. Co. v. Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13 F.2d. 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1926) ("we see no reason why the legal
burden of proof should shift"), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 747 (1927) with Aerovox Corp.
v. Polymet Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860, 861 (2d Cir. 1933) (rejecting Austin and accepting Smith & Griggs as "authoritative").
241. TPLab., 724 F.2d at 971.
242. 815 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
243. Id. at 1481 n.2 (interpreting TP Lab. as holding that "there was no experimental use exception per se," but "that the court must look to the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether there has been a public use within the meanings of § 102(b)").
244. See ADELMAN, supra note 223, at § 2.3[7.-3] (stating TP Lab. "has undone
100 years of relatively well-settled jurisprudence in an area already fraught with
uncertainty"); CHISUM, supra note 6, § 6.02[8] at 6-160 n.15 ('The court's basis for
this holding is questionable."); ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT 83-84 (3d ed. 1994) (interpreting TP Lab. as injecting "a note of uncertain-

ty" into the law that the patentee bears the burden of proving experimental use);
Herbert H. Mintz & Richard B. Racine, Anticipation And Obviousness In The Federal Circuit, 13 AIPIA Q.J. 195, 201 (1985) (interpreting TP Lab. as conflicting
with other Federal Circuit case law).
245. TP. Lab. 724 F.2d at 971 n.3. See CHISUM, supra note 6, at § 6.02[8] at 6160 n.15.
246. TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971 n.3. As Professor Chisum points out, the 1952 enactment of the presumption of validity in § 282 "was generally thought to have
codified prior law." CHISUM, supra note 6, at § 6.02[8] at 6-160 n.15.
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45

dent from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals which is
binding.2 47 Nor did the court address the fact that the presumption of validity long predated the 1952 patent statute.2
According to the commentators, the TP Laboratories panel
also failed to appreciate that experimental purpose is not just one
more fact to throw into the "totality of circumstances" to be considered. 249 Rather, it is a separate inquiry that is in the nature
of an affirmative defense. That is, an allegation of experimental
use avoids or "negates," rather than rebuts, the assertion that the
invention was offered, sold or used in public more than one year
before the patent application was filed. One may argue that placing the burden of proof of experimental use on the patentee or
applicant is entirely consistent with the general rule that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof as to the elements of its cause of
action, while the defendant has the burden of establishing affirmative defenses."' As the proponent of the "affirmative defense"
of experimental use, the patentee or applicant should be required
to prove experimental use. This would implement the general rule
that the burden of proof or persuasion
as to a fact or issue gener25 1
ally rests on the party asserting it.

Another reason for imposing the burden of proof of experimental use on the patentee or applicant would be that, in most
cases, that party has in its possession the facts regarding the use,
offer or sale. Except in rare cases, the patentee or applicant will
always have at least as much access to the information as the
alleged infringer or the Patent Examiner. 52 That a matter lies
peculiarly within the knowledge of a party suggests that party
should have the burden of proof.253
247. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. The court may have ignored
these cases because the issue was not disputed. See National Cable Television
Assoc., Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("When an issue is not argued or is ignored in a decision, such decision is not precedent to be followed in a subsequent case in which the issue arises").
248. See D. Journeaux, Public Use in Private, or Vice Versa, 23 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 514, 516-17 (1941).
249. See supra note 244. Regardless of how heavy the evidence of a use in public
or a sale or offer to sell weighs, it cannot outweigh (or even be weighed against)
evidence of experimental purpose, which can be viewed as mixing apples and oranges.
250. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 104(b) (1964). A corollary to this rule is that a party
asserting the affirmative of a proposition should have the burden of proving that
proposition. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 589 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
251. GASKINS, supra note 228, at 23 ("Traditional legal commentary has been
comfortable placing burdens on the party seeking the law's intervention"); 31A
C.J.S. Evidence § 104(a) (1964).
252. This is so because the patentee or applicant cannot rely on the experimental
activities of the alleged infringer to establish experimental use. See supra notes
225-26 and accompanying text.
253. Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir.
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All that having been said, however, these arguments overlook
that the Supreme Court has applied a burden of proof analysis
identical to that of TP.Laboratories. For example, in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks,254 the Court explained the burden of
proof associated with Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination
because of race. To prevail under this section, the plaintiff "must
first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a 'prima facie'
case of racial discrimination." 255 The prima facie case requires
that the employee be a minority, be qualified, suffer an adverse
employment action and that the benefit denied go to a non-minority. 256 Establishment of the prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee, a presumption that shifts the burden of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie case to the employer.2 5 7 Although the
burden of production shifts to the employer, the burden of proof
remains on the employee. If the employer carries its burden of
production, the presumption created by the prima facie case disappears." 8 At this point, the trier of fact must decide, based on
all the facts and circumstances, whether the employee has been
the victim of discrimination.
The St. Mary's Honor Center analysis is identical to that used
in TP Laboratories. Even though the "rebuttal" (action taken for
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons) to the prima facie case
(qualified minority subjected to adverse employment action which
benefitted a non-minority) avoids, rather than directly rebuts, the
elements of the prima facie case, the proponent of the prima facie
case has the only burden of proof. Although the Supreme Court's
holding in St. Mary's Honor Center supports the TP Laboratories
analysis, patent law precedent and common sense suggest that
the burden of proof on experimental use should be placed on the
proponent of experimental use.
3. The Standard of Proofof Experimental Use
The public use bar has long been known as "the last refuge of
the desperate infringer."5 9 Surely then, experimental use negation of the public use and on sale bars is the last refuge of the
desperate patentee. That is so because experience, in the form of
reported decisions, shows that an assertion of experimental use is

1985);
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 104(a), 113 (1964).
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
Id. at 2747.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Charles W. Rivise, Public Use, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 348, 354 (1929).
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highly improbable and rarely successful.
Perhaps because of the highly improbable nature of the assertion, in Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague, s° the
Supreme Court identified the standard of proof borne by the proponent of experimental use as requiring evidence "full, unequivocal, and convincing."261 In later cases, many courts, including the Supreme Court,262 followed Smith & Griggs in applying the "full, unequivocal, and convincing" standard of proof to
the inherently improbable assertion of experimental use.
Although Smith & Griggs employed the "full, unequivocal,
and convincing" standard in inter partes litigation between a patentee and an alleged infringer, the Federal Circuit's predecessor
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,263 applied that
same standard to proof of experimental use in the ex parte proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office. The Federal Circuit
itself followed these cases in applying the "full, unequivocal, and
convincing" standard in reviewing decisions from the Patent and
Trademark Office. 2" Although the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court applied variations of this standard," 5 these variations all referred to the same standard of proof, what is referred
to in modern parlance as the "clear and convincing" standard.
All these ex parte cases relied either on Smith & Griggs or
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeal's decision in In re
Josserand,266 to support application of the clear and convincing
standard (or a variation) in the ex parte context. Of course, Smith
& Griggs was an inter partes case, where the patentee had to
prove facts underlying the public use or on sale bar by clear and
convincing evidence.26 7 Josserand merely held that experimental
use must be shown "affirmatively."26 Application of the inter

260. 123 U.S. 249 (1887).
261. Id. at 265. This explication of the standard of proof was a holding; the
Smith & Griggs Court rejected the assertion of experimental use because the "testimony of the patentee seems to be vague and indefinite." Id.
262. Root v. Third Ave. R.R., 146 U.S. 210, 226 (1892).
263. In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393,
1400 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
264. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
265. Id. at 1135 ("Where as here, the inventor made the allegedly public use, he
has the burden of going forward with convincing evidence that the public use activities fall within the experimental use exception" and "Since the appellants have
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the St. Louis test falls within
the experimental use exception"); In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 784 (C.C.P.A. 1957)
("The inventor bears a heavy burden of establishing by affirmative and convincing
proof that the alleged public use or sale was ...

experimentation").

266. 188 F.2d 486 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
267. E.g. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed.
Cir.); Buildex, 849 F.2d at 1463.
268. 188 F.2d 486, 491 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
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partes clear and convincing standard of proof to ex parte proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office, where all other determinations are made under the preponderance of the evidence
standard,269 appears to have been done without much reason, or
even thought.
But, after TP Laboratories, the standard of proof issue may
well'be moot. In that case, the Federal Circuit explained that the
patentee or applicant does not have a burden of proof on experimental use. Standards of proof usually go hand in hand with
burdens of proof. In eliminating the separate burden of proof on
experimental use, TP Laboratoriesmay have eliminated the clear
and convincing standard of proof as well. The Federal Circuit has
yet to address this issue in a way that sheds any light on whether
the clear and convincing standard of proof still exists." °
Both precedent and common sense suggest that the clear and
convincing standard should be applied in inter partes cases. On
the other hand, there seems to be no good reason, save some poorly reasoned precedent, for applying the clear and convincing standard in ex parte cases.
4. Experimental Use As Fact or Law
The Federal Circuit has held that experimental use is a factual issue." 1 This holding is important because it dictates that
the trier of fact must decide experimental use at the trial level
and is reviewed under the clearly erroneous or substantial evidence standards of review at the appellate level. By way of contrast, a legal conclusion may be decided by the court - not the
jury - at the trial level and is reviewed for mere error at the appellate level.
Like the standard of proof of experimental use, however,
experimental use may have changed from fact to law as a result of
TP Laboratories.If, as the TP Laboratories court held, there are

269. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d
at 674.
270. In Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co., 815 F.2d
1478, 1482 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the Federal Circuit dodged the issue in a footnote,
but suggested that application of a clear and convincing standard of proof to experimental use in the inter partes context would be improper. Harmon recognizes that
the continued existence of the clear and convincing standard of proof on experimental use is an open question. HARMON, supra note 244, at 83 n.191.
271. Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1987). Likewise, the earliest circuit court decisions, Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas.
1074, 1077-78 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585) and Morris v. Huntington, 17 F.
Cas. 818, 819 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824) (No. 9,831), held that experimental use is a question for the jury. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly held that experimental
use is a question of fact. E.g., Micro-Magnetic Indus., Inc. v. Advanced Automatic
Sales Co., 488 F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1973) (collecting cases).
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not two separate issues (was it public use? and was it experimental?) but one (was it public use under section 102(b)?), the experimental use issue may have been merged into the legal conclusion
of public use or on sale bar. On the other hand, the issue of
whether the intent of the activity was primarily experimental is a
distinct issue, one that partakes of the kind of272historical determination that is usually labeled a finding of fact.
In a recent opinion, one Federal Circuit panel bent over backwards to avoid the factual/legal nature of experimental use. Without so much as a nod to the precedential holding that experimental use is a question of fact, the panel labelled experimental use
"fact driven," but implied that it is an "ultimate legal
question."273 This vagueness may have been motivated by experimental use being the alleged genuine issue of material fact on
review of a district court's grant of summary judgment, rather
than the court's reluctance to confront the changing nature of the
experimental use issue from fact to law resulting from TP Laboratories.
Just like the standard of proof, the question of the factual/legal nature of experimental use will have to await further
word from the Federal Circuit. But precedent and common sense
suggest a clear answer: experimental use is a question of fact.
CONCLUSION

The policy in favor of allowing the inventor the opportunity
to reduce the invention to practice is furthered by an activity
performed by the inventor or one substantially under his direction
to show that the invention would be suitable for its intended purpose. Accordingly, such activities, labelled experimental use,
would not create an on sale or public use bar to patentability.
The determination of whether the purpose of an offer, sale or
use was experimental is necessarily fact intensive. The Federal
Circuit has identified an extensive list of factors to help in that
task. By identifying these factors and focusing the inquiry on the
purpose of the activity, the court has closely tracked the law set
forth by the Supreme Court over 100 years ago.
In other areas, however, the Federal Circuit has strayed far
and wide from the law envisioned by the Supreme Court. Important areas of the law of experimental use are in need of clarification. In particular, the Federal Circuit needs to resolve inconsistencies in its precedent regarding the policy underlying experi-

272. Indeed, the very first experimental use case, Morris, held that experimental
use is a question for the jury. 17 F. Cas. at 819.
273. Paragon Podiatry, Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
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mental use itself, the factual/legal nature of experimental use, the
standard and burden of proof of experimental use and the relationship between an inventor's intent and the purpose underlying
the allegedly experimental activity. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit needs to totally rethink its application of, and sharply limit
its approach to, applying experimental use to design patents.
The Federal Circuit should reject the heresy that the policy
underlying experimental use is to allow the inventor time to assess the value of the invention or to decide whether to expend the
time and expense to file a patent application. The policy underlying experimental use is to allow the inventor the opportunity to
reduce the invention to practice that is, to build, or have built, an
embodiment and, if necessary, to test, or have tested, that embodiment to demonstrate that the invention will work for its intended
purpose. As a result, the purpose of the activity allegedly subject
to the bar is the focus of the experimental use inquiry, an inquiry
separate from the prima facie case of either the public use or on
sale bars.
As a question of the purpose for which the allegedly barring
activity was conducted, experimental use is an issue of fact, and it
has been considered an issue of fact since the doctrine was created
in 1824. As the Supreme Court held in 1887, the proponent of
experimental use should have the burden of proving experimental
use - perhaps the last refuge of the desperate patentee - by
clear and convincing evidence.
The nine principles of experimental use identified by the
Supreme Court in City of Elizabeth and Smith & Griggs provide
the basis for repairing the damage done to experimental negation
of the public use and on sale bars by the entropy of the Federal
Circuit's case law. Only by returning to the law as it stood over
100 years ago and by keeping an eye on the policy underlying
experimental use could the Federal Circuit return the law in this
area to a state of common sense and reasonable, if not sublime,
simplicity.
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